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In December 2007, Kenyans went to the polls to elect a president, Member of Parliament, and local 
councillor. As citizens who had most recently voted out one of Africa's longest standing "Big Men," 
in Daniel Arap Moi, there was an understandable level of excitement and enthusiasm from citizens 
to exercise their vote once again, as well as from the rest of world which was eager to uphold Kenya 
as a model of African democracy. Unfortunately as the polls closed five days later; the Kenyan 
Electoral Commission had been disgraced, the two main political parties were mired in ballot stuffing 
accusations, and violence had engulfed Nairobi, Kisumu, and the Rift Valley. While the flawed 
election led to an irreplaceable loss of life and severely damaged the nation's economy and 
reputation, it is unclear whether this flawed election would diminish Kenyan's democratic health and 
progress towards democratic consolidation. Indeed, recent and compelling social science evidence 
suggests that flawed elections do not necessarily hinder democratic development in Africa, and thus 
the greatest indication of Kenya's democratic progress was simply that the election was held. 
However, as a witness to Kenya's 2007 election, I feared that Kenya's democratic progress would be 
severely impeded as people voiced their discontent with elections, voting, political parties, and most 
importantly, democracy itself. In an attempt to determine if in fact flawed elections have a long-
term detrimental impact on democratic health and consolidation I investigate the relationship 
between the "freeness and fairness," of elections {or electoral quality} and two indicators of 
democratic health: {1} popular perceptions of democratic supply and {2} popular demand for 
democracy. "Supply," is measured as popular satisfaction with the way democracy works plus the 
recognition of living in a democracy. "Demand," is measured as support for democracy plus 
rejection of three forms of authoritarianism, military rule, one man rule and one party rule. These 
indicators are aggregate measures taken from responses to Afrobarometer surverys, and have been 
utilized previously to assess citizen's views of democracy and the prospects for democratic growth 
and consolidation. 
Using three rounds of Afrobarometer surveys I analyze data from 18 countries and 33 elections in 
Africa between 1996 and 2005, using both elections and countries as the unit of analysis. The 
empirical results demonstrate that there is a strong correlation between electoral quality and 
perceived supply of democracy, but no correlation between electoral quality and the current level of 
demand. In other words electorates tend to see electoral outcomes as the preeminent event in 
determining how satisfied they are with democracy, but do not directly link the outcome of the most 
recent election to their support for democracy. Although the level of electoral quality did not 
directly correlate with the level of demand, further analysis showed that flawed elections on average 
negatively influence both supply and demand. Free and Fair elections, on the other hand, had a 
much smaller but positive influence on supply and demand. Taken together, there is compelling 
evidence to suggest that electoral outcomes do shape people's perception and support for 
democracy. If in fact citizen opinion and support for democracy is critical to democratic 
consolidation than this research finds that flawed elections can significantly impede democratic 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Problem 
On December 27th 2007 Kenyans went to the polls to vote for a presidential, parliamentary, and 
local government candidate. Although not as euphoric as the 2002 poll that saw the defeat of long-
standing authoritarian leader Daniel Arap Moi and his KANU party, there was still plenty of 
excitement. Pubs closed and their owners left notes urging their customers to go vote, some even 
promised free beer with an inked thumb. Some Matatu1 drivers offered free rides to polling stations 
and some even refused to take passengers unless their fingers were inked. Lines at polling stations 
began to form in the pre-dawn hours and by mid morning snaked around city blocks for kilometres 
on end.2 By the end of the day turnout was hovering near 70% of registered voters, and nearly all 
polling places reported a peaceful and relatively orderly process. However by the evening of 
December 28th , the opposition candidate Ralia Odinga had an almost insurmountable one million 
vote lead, and rumours started circling. Indeed more than 75% of the vote had yet to come in from 
President Kibaki's stronghold of Central Province, and most pre-election polls predicted that the 
could expect to garner more than 94% of the million plus votes in the region. By the dawn of the 
New Year (2008) most of these votes were in, President Kibaki was sworn in as President, and the 
rumours of widespread voter fraud, and tampering by Electoral Commission officials turned out to 
be all to true. From that moment on violence erupted in contested provinces and Odinga 
strongholds of Nairobi and Kisumu. High level mediators such as former UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan to US Under-Secretary of State Jendyai Frazer shuttled in to press the two sides to form a 
coalition government. When things calmed down enough for people to venture into town, 
everywhere people seemed to utter the same refrain, "I'm never voting again:,3 
Yet the existing political science literature says Kenyans will vote again, and again, in roughly the 
same numbers as before. According to Steffan Lindberg the quality of the election rarely if ever 
affects the level of voter participation in a subsequent election in Africa's new mUlti-party systems. 
Only by the fourth election is there any significant deviation in voter turnout according to the quality 
of elections (67% for free and fair, 52% for flawed).4 Indeed additional data shows that regardless 
1 Mini-buses used as public transportation in Kenya 
2 See www.kenyavotes.com for a number of video feeds detailing the Km long lines and interviews with Kenyans on 
election day 
3 As an employee of the National Democratic Institute, I had the opportunity to participate in the electoral process and 
observe the post election fallout. The observations I discuss herein are entirely my own. 











of the quality the more elections a country convene the more democratic it becomes.s This data 
not only runs contrary to my first hand account in Kenya, but it also suggests that the quality of 
elections has little to do with the health of democracy in Africa 
However African voters and international actors, however, continue to place tremendous emphasis 
on elections, and their outcomes. Domestically, elections provide citizens with an opportunity to 
activate their agency and participate in the democratic process. Due to the low levels of education 
and general democratic activity, many citizens in new democracies think that elections and only 
elections are both the basis and the culmination of the democratic process, making voting day the 
pre-eminent event upon which "democracy" is judged. 
The international community also pays close attention to elections in Africa, and provides substantial 
funding towards building the capacity of electoral officials, domestic observers, and national 
organizational ability to guarantee a free and fair poll. 6 In addition the international community 
sends hundreds of international observers to audit the voting process and support or challenge the 
validity of outcomes. In short the level of scrutiny new democracies in Africa face on Election Day is 
unprecedented. This pattern of international attention, funding, and domestic pressure for a 
"successful," election are unlikely to change. Thus it benefits both international and domestic actors 
to fully understand the consequences of an election with both good and bad outcomes. Lindberg's 
conclusions suggests that international resources and domestic attention might be better spent 
ensuring that elections take place rather than ensuring free and fair outcomes. Yet is the quality of 
election outcomes as insignificant as the data suggests? 
Democratic Consolidation and the Role of Elections in Africa 
Africa has experienced two distinct periods of democratic growth or transition. The first was in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s when colonial powers decided it was no longer worth the cost in goods or 
violence to continue their oppressive systems. 7 Following independence most countries moved to 
establish a government based loosely on socialist or democratic norms. These countries however 
quickly slid from hopeful newly independent nations to autocratic and ethnically divided still born 
nation-states. The second phase occurred after the end of the Cold War when both the United 
States and the Former Soviet Union no longer had an interest in propping up autocratic regimes.8 
Since the fall of the Berlin wall, nearly every African country has attempted to move in some way 
5 As measured by the Freedom House's indices of political rights and civil liberties in Lindberg, 2006 
6 Elkin, 2002 
7 Diamond 1999, 3; Huntington 1991, 60 











towards a more democratic system. Indeed by 1992 more than half the countries in Africa held 
"founding," or "re-founding" elections. 9 
As the number of countries undergoing democratic transitions increased, scholars found an 
increasingly rich pool of cases to analyze. Most of the initial scholarship focused on why some 
transitions succeed and some failed, with O'Donnell and Schmitter's "Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule," (1986) and Bratton and van de Walle's "Democratic Experiments in Africa," (1997) being the 
most comprehensive of these studies. Scholars also sought to determine if there were certain 
factors that made a country more "ready," for democracy than others. However as these new 
democracies continue to proliferate and their paths towards becoming more established 
democracies continued to diverge other scholars began to argue that 1) there were no prerequisites 
and 2) that the prerequisites for transition may be better viewed as indicators of consolidation. 
"What the literature has considered in the past to be the preconditions for democracy may better be 
conceived in the future as outcomes of different types of democracy ... patterns of greater economic 
growth ... such as "civic" political culture .. .independent variables in the past might be more fruitfully 
conceived as dependent variables in the future."lo Indeed the literature on democratic 
consolidation has now outpaced the study of democratic transition. Significant scholarship has been 
produced to determine both the drivers of consolidation and how to measure its progress. Similar 
to the scholarship on democratic transitions most consolidation scholarship focuses on independent 
variables that can be divided into three main groups attitudinal, behavioural, and institutional. 
Interestingly elections playa significant role in each of these categories. 
Consolidation through Institutionalization 
Early scholarship contended that political institutions played a minimal role in determining the 
success and effectiveness of the governing structure or stability of the body politic. Scholars that 
subscribed to this argument or "systems analysts," fixed their focus on the inputs and outputs of a 
political system and largely ignored the function and form of a democratic system, often thinking of 
it as a 'black box.' 11 In this model, institutions are viewed as a mere by products of a more 
fundamental phenomenon like class conflict or competition. In other words institutions when 
created are designed to reduce transaction costs or preserve the position of elites in society, not to 
alter the nature of political behaviour.12 
9 Lindberg 2006, 52 
10 Karl and Schmitter, 270 
11 Easton 1968, Tilly 1978 











In the late 1980s however, scholars began to reject this paradigm and attempted to "bring the state 
back in," recognizing that institutions were autonomous political forces in their own right.13 
"Institutions are real, independent entities that are capable of shaping society by redefining 
individual and group identities.,,14 Scholars began to argue that institutions mattered largely 
because of the rules, logic, and structure that created a series of incentives and disincentives which 
influenced how the state developed and its citizens behaved.15 Indeed some scholars went further 
in their claim to note that institutions matter because of their direct and significant influence on 
norms, beliefs, and actions, and most importantly, the ability of institutions to shape outcomes.16 
Thus the emerging consensus was that political democracy and consolidation depended not only on 
the economic and social conditions but also on the design of the political institutions precisely 
because of the behaviours they facilitate or obstruct.17 As both citizens and elites become more 
accustomed to the democratic "rules of the game," their behaviour would become more liberal and 
democratic. larry Diamond describes this process of "political institutionalization" as, "a move 
towards routinezied, recurrent, and predictable patterns of democratic behaviour."18 
To that end practioners and scholars ofthe institutionalism school believe that building democratic 
institutions such as a judiciary, legislature, and a constitution that is imbedded with democratic 
norms are the key elements for a democratic foundation. Researchers have worked to identify 
what type of democratic institutions are more likely to lead to rapid and successful consolidation 
such as the type of state (unitary of federal), electoral system (winner take all or proportional 
representation), or the nature of the executive (presidential or parliamentary).19 For example, some 
scholars believe that parliamentary systems are better placed to resolve cleavages in deeply divided 
societies because the behaviour they induce is based on compromise and coalition building. 20 Other 
scholars have found that the key determinant for democratic consolidation is not only the type of 
executive, but its interaction with other key institutions such as party systems and electoral rules. 
"Different combinations of preSidential, electoral, and party systems can have profound effects on 
13 Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol1985 
14 March and Olsen, 16 
15 North, 1989; Madison, 1787 
16 Przeworski, 527 
17 March and Olsen, 1989 Lijphart,1985; Horowitz, 1991; Linz, 1990a and 1991b; Grofman & Lijphart, 1986; Reynolds, 
1999;Weaver & Rockman, 1993; Macyntyre, 2003; (olomer, 2001; Reynolds, 2002 
18 Diamond, 75 
19 Liphart, 1985; DiPalma, 1990; Horowitz, 1991a and 199b; Linz, 1991a and 
1991b; Reynolds, 1993; Sisk; 1996; Reilly, 2002; Reynolds, 2002; (olomer, 2001; Macintyre, 
2003; Norris, 1999; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Bratton & (ho, 2005; (olomer, 2001 











democratic performance ... thus the lesson for a new democracy is that the choice of institutions is 
directly linked to the challenges of democratic consolidation.,,21 
Other scholars have found that development of the executive office and the behaviour of the 
executive is a key indicator of democratic consolidation. In Africa, Posner and Young found evidence 
of democratic consolidation in behaviour of executive office holders. Since 1995 more presidents 
and executive office holders in Africa are leaving by peaceful or constitutional means compared to 
the 1980s. This suggests elites are increasingly abiding by democratic rules and norms or have 
institutionalized democratic behaviour. "Across sub-saharan Africa, formal institutional rules are 
coming to matter much more than they used to, and have displaced violence as the primary source 
of constraints on executive behaviour."22 
However, of all the institutions that are deemed critical to democratic consolidation, none has 
received more attention than elections. "Electoral systems are commonly regarded as some of the 
most basic democratic structure from which much else flows.,,23 Most scholars would agree that 
although elections are insufficient to ensure and strengthen representative democracy free and fair 
elections are an essential and minimal condition for consolidation. In their simplicity elections and 
electoral law embody the idea that formal rules determine political behaviour, or that "formal 
electoral rules generate important incentives that are capable of shaping and constraining political 
behaviour."24 
To date most scholarship on elections has focused on the endemic problems that elections 
underscore, namely inadequate levels of voter education 2sexacerbating ethnic divisions 26zero sum 
or winner take all incentives/7 and the differing effects of other electoral rUles. 28 Other research 
has found that the quality of the election and even the manner in which an election is held is a key 
indicator of a government's capacity for service delivery.29 Elections and voting patterns also 
provide an opportunity for citizens to validate or reject a government and even a form of regime (as 
in referendums). Indeed the focus on elections is not without reason. There is hardly another event 
that does so much to focus international and domestic attention and produces relevant useful data 
that would otherwise not be available. 
21 Noriss, 180 
22 Posner and Young, 126 
23 Norris 235 
24 Norris 239 
2S Morison, 2006 
26 Green, 2006 
27 Sandbrook, 2005 
28 Norris, 2004 











The most salient publication to this study, Lindberg's "Democracy and Elections in Africa," finds a 
strong correlation between elections and democratic growth.3D After compiling a massive dataset 
that includes information on 264 elections in Africa since 198931, Lindberg concludes, "the inception 
of multiparty elections usually initiates liberalization and repeated electoral activities create 
incentives for political fostering ... the expansion and deepening of democratic values.,,32 By simply 
looking at the number of elections each country has held, and their associated Freedom House 
composite scores he shows that countries that hold more elections are indeed considered more 
"free." Countries such as Benin, Cape Verde, and Botswana that have had 4 or more elections all are 
listed as "free," with a score of 2 or below on FH composite ranking. Whereas countries such as 
Mauritania, and Guinea Bissau who have only held one election are listed as partly free with an 
average score of 4.33 
It is important to recognize that Lindberg concludes that it is the holding of elections that initiates 
the liberalization and not the other way around. "The inception of mUltiparty elections usually 
initiates liberalization and repeated electoral activities create incentives for political actors fostering 
the expansion and deepening of democratic values ... a sequence of elections tends to expand and 
solidify de factor civil liberties in society." 34 In other words by initializing and repeating the electoral 
process, more people become sensitised to the rules of the game, it opens up political space, and 
raises expectations. 
Furthermore he shows that the effect of increasing liberalization does not depend on the quality of 
the election, that is whether or not elections are free and fair or flawed. In a subsequent paper he 
shows quite convincingly that the quality of the election has little impact on voter turnout until the 
fourth election. Indeed people seem to turn up for each subsequent election regardless of the 
outcome or the quality of the previous one. By the fourth election however, citizens begin to 
recognize a flawed election when they see one. "This seems reasonable. If you have participated in 
more than three flawed elections without any real effect, delusion starts to set in.,,35 
Lindberg's analYSis then makes a strong institutional argument in support of the theory that 
democratic institutions and rules lead to democratic behaviours and thus strengthens consolidation. 
He also refutes the premise that elections are the result of a deeping of democratic values. 
30 Lindberg, 2006 
31 Lindberg, 2006 compiles data for 232 elections between 1989 and 2003, Lindberg, 2007 adds an additional 34 elections 
between 2003 and 2006. 
32 Lindberg, 2007 
33 Lindberg 2006, 140 
34 Lindberg, 2007 











Furthermore he demonstrates that neither violence nor prior experience with a flawed election 
deters voters from participating. Thus the simple process of holding elections and the public's 
participation in them, can lead to democratic consolidation. Lindberg fails however to more closely 
scrutinize the path dependency of election irregularities. Nor does his analysis take into account the 
effect of elections and their quality on public support for democracy. Indeed there is likely to be 
tension between Lindberg's findings that elections spur democratic consolidation regardless of the 
quality and political studies that argue consolidation is a result of legitimation. 
Consolidation by Legitimation 
While the scholars described above contend that the development of political institutions is 
sufficient to confer legitimacy and ensure consolidation another group of scholars believe that 
institutions are but one necessary condition to ensure democratic consolidation. Indeed this group 
of scholars believe that a democracy requires democratic institutions and democrats. In other 
words a democracy will not consolidate unless the public believes in and embodies democratic 
values. fllf the democratic model is to develop it will require more than the formal institutions of 
democracy ... it will require a political culture consistent with it (democracy).,,36 Almond and Verba 
were the one of the first of this culturalist school that argued that for a democracy to take root in 
society, certain values and characteristics had to be present. They describe a culture conducive to 
democracy as a "civic culture" with characteristics of openness, trust and confidence, the capacity to 
share values with others, and one that was free of fear and anxiety.37 Other scholars looked for the 
presence of social traits in society to determine the readiness of a country for democracy.38 Some of 
the traits that scholars think are necessary in a democratic political culture include but are not 
limited to tolerance, pragmatism, flexibility, trust, willingness to compromise, and civility.39 
One of the most well known contemporary studies on political culture is Robert Putnam's Bowling 
Alone which examines the importance of "social trust/' in building and sustaining a democracy. 
Putnam suggests that participation in community organizations such as bowling clubs, parent 
teacher associations, and philanthropic groups both instils a set of norms and values on individuals 
and has a wider effect on the body politic based on the aggregation of interests and building of 
36 Almond and Verba, 5 
37 Ibid 
38 Almond Verba 1963; Booth Seligson 1994, Gibson Dutch 1992; Diamond 1998; Putnam 1995; Norris 2002 











social trust. He suggests that this can be categorized and measured as social capital, the critical 
component in a democratic political culture.4o 
Other scholars have examined the presence of these democratic traits in emerging democratic 
societies. For example a comprehensive study of residents in Moscow's Oblast district found 
support for 11 out of 12 democratic values at or above the level in most consolidated democracies. 
The one value, however, where Russian's scored lower was tolerance.41 More importantly however 
a subsequent study found that residents who expressed their support for democratic values were 
also likely to participate in defending democracy during the Soviet Putsch of 1995. This suggests 
that a strong democratic culture will prevent emerging democracies from backsliding.42 Indeed 
other scholars undertook similar studies to look for mass support for similar values in emerging 
democracies of Latin America and Africa.43 
However, critics of this argument contend that measuring democracy in the abstract or as an ideal it 
is less than meaningful and leads to inaccurate conclusions. Most citizens, regardless of their 
country will support democracy as an ideal, much as they will support the characteristics of a 
"democratic culture," such as "trust," "tolerance," or "equality." Although critical of the culturalist 
argument, this group of scholars agrees that institutions are insufficient for consolidation; yet they 
believe that for a democracy to consolidate it is more important for citizens in a new democracy to 
voice a preference for democracy than it is for them to embody democratic ideals. This realist 
approach avoids abstract and idealistic labels by asking citizens to evaluate regimes as they have 
personally experienced them.44 Indeed for scholars who advocate a realist methodology citizens 
must prefer the democratic regime to the authoritarian one which in turn will engender legitimacy 
and support for democracy. 
The legitimacy of any political system is determined when political authority is accepted by citizens 
or subjects. Authoritarian regimes often rely on coercion or force to achieve dominance or diminish 
resistance but it is often insufficient to achieve acceptance.45 In a new democracy, legitimacy or 
acceptance of the political authority is derived from regime performance. "If procedural 
commitment forms the principal foundation of regime consolidation, the performance of the regime 
40 Putnam 1995 
41 Gibson Dutch Tedin1992 
42 Gibson 1996, in this study Gibson went back and interviewed the same people to gauge their reaction and participation 
in the pro democracy protests of 1992 in Russia. 
43 Booth and Seligson examined political cultures in Costa Rica and Mexico 1994; Richard Sklar examined political culture in 
Sub-Saharan Africa in 1996 
44 Rose and Mischler 











is a crucial variable affecting the development and internalization of beliefs about legitimacy."46 In 
other words regimes must continue to perform adequately in the eyes of citizens in order to gain 
acceptance and engender legitimacy. How exactly regimes do this and which reforms gain the most 
traction with publics in developing democracies is still very much in question. The debate largely 
centres on the delivery of economic goods versus the delivery of political goods. 
Initially scholars focused heavily on the delivery of economic goods, or "the politics of the belly." 
Empirical analysis suggested that citizens in developing countries and emerging democracies would 
support whatever regime was able to provide the most tangible goods (food, clothing, shelter) the 
quickest. More importantly failure to provide food or jobs would lead people to support 
authoritarian alternatives to democrac/7 Initial studies in post communist states and in Russia 
immediately following the fall of communism found economic performance to be a critical pillar of 
regime support.48 For example Mishler and Rose advocated a "fear and hope/' model in which 
support was based heavily on fear of the old regime and hope for improved economic conditions 
under democracy.49 "The strongest relationship between regime support and economic variables is 
registered by public evaluations of current macroeconomic performance." Meaning citizens base 
their support for the regime on improved national economic conditions and opportunities. However 
in subsequent studies they determined that "economic conditions are but one basis by which 
citizens evaluate regime performance."so Rose and Mischler conclude that experiences with past 
regimes, economic performance and political performance are the three key sub groups that 
determine regime support. 
Building on this work, other scholars found that the delivery of political goods was crucial to 
encouraging support for the regime, democracy, and subsequent consolidation. In an effort to 
determine which political good had the greatest influence on support for the regime and support for 
democracy, scholars studied the effect of personal freedoms, an independent judiciary, elections, 
and the delivery of other political goods.s1 Of these political goods scholars have found presidential 
performance to be closely related to regime support and then to support for democracy. "Perceived 
performance of the national president is a convenient touchstone for many Africans in deciding 
where they stand on regime-level issues. If they approve and trust the president they project these 
46 Diamond, 77 
47 pzerwoski et al. 1995. The book itself was produced to address the fear that the structural adjustment programs 
proposed by the IMF for new democracies would reduce the regime's ability to provide economic goods and thus in danger 
the sustainability of democracy. 
48 Mischler Rose 1993, Carr Poffenberger Gordon 2000, Gibson Dutch 1995 
49 Mischler and Rose 1995 575 
50 Mischler and Rose 91 











positive sentiments onto democracy.,,52 The belief that the delivery of political goods is of greater 
importance than economic goods for long term democratic consolidation has continued to attract 
support as enhancing civil liberties and delivering free and fair elections are seen as relatively easy 
compared to improving the national economic outlook. 
Scholars on both sides of the economic vs political goods debate, however, argued that in 
developing democracies, support for democracy can be derived from regime support as citizens 
often equate the regime with larger governance issues. And if support for democracy can be 
derived from support for the regime, then regime performance is a critical component of democratic 
consolidation. Indeed scholars have argued that for a democracy to be considered consolidated, 
citizens must be satisfied with regime and believe that democracy is the best form of government. 
"Stable democracy requires a belief in the legitimacy of democracy ... that democracy is the best form 
of government possible.,,53 Larry Diamond strengthened this claim by suggesting that democracies 
can only be considered consolidated if 2/3 of the public believe in the legitimacy of democracy. 
Given the emphasis on citizen support, scholars were searching for valid public opinion data that was 
consistently collected across countries and across time. 54 The Afrobarometer, which began 
surveying 12 African countries in 1999, is a step towards improving the validity of research by 
improving the credibility and consistency of the data used. Mattes and Bratton use this data set to 
examine how African's form attitudes towards democracy. They found it useful to segment citizen 
attitudes towards democracy between indicators of democratic supply of and indicators of demand 
for democracy. They measure demand by adding "support for democracy," and "rejection of 
authoritarianism," and they measure supply as "recognition of being in a democracy," plus 
"satisfaction with democracy." Indeed the segmenting of public opinion is useful as it captures the 
two strains of consolidation theory described above; that democracies will only consolidate when 
citizens demand democracy and are satisfied with the amount of democracy being supplied by the 
regime.55 Similarly but not identical to Diamond and Rose Mischler, Bratton and Mattes believe that 
democracy has a low probability of breaking down where citizens both demand democracy as their 
preferred form of government and feel that their leaders have internalized democracy's 
52Bratton, Mattes, Gyimah-Boadi 
53 Diamond, 168 
54 Diamond 1994, 212 Although Diamond's is the most expansive almost all of the articles discussed here are followed by a 
brief critique or caveats surrounding the problems with the public opinion data utilized in that particular study 











"institutional ruleso"56 These two indicators then should provide insight into the prospects for and 
progress of consolidation. 
After examining the first round of public opinion data in twelve African countries Mattes and Bratton 
conclude that there is significant evidence to support a "cognitive learning" model of the origins of 
popular opinion.57 Indeed Mattes and Bratton found Africans learn about democracy through direct 
experience and interactions with associated institutions. Furthermore they make judgements about 
democracy based on regime performance, specifically whether the regime is able to deliver political 
goods such as freedom of speech, press, and ensuring free and fair elections.58 This finding lends 
support to Diamond's "autonomy ofthe political," or his beliefthat citizens' base their support for 
democracy on the expansion of political rights and is independent of economic growth.59 
Elections then may play an even greater role in influencing democratic support at the national level, 
due to the fact that there are few opportunities outside of elections for citizens to engage 
democratic institutions.60 Furthermore if democratic support is determined by the regimes 
delivering political goods such as free and fair elections, then in a cognitive learning model the 
quality of the election should have a disproportionate effect on support for the regime, support for 
democracy and the prospects for democratic consolidation. 
Indeed, one study that examined the relationship between electoral quality and public opinion 
found that the quality of an election affects public opinion and has a "legitimizing effect." Devra 
Moehler was able to show that on some levels electoral quality influences support for democracy 
and willingness to defend democratic institutions.61 Different to this study, however, she focused on 
the legitimacy gap between winners and losers and not directly on the effect of electoral quality on 
levels of supply and demand or democratic consolidation. Thus while it is encouraging that she 
found evidence of a correlation between electoral quality and changes in public opinion, the focus 
and construction of her study makes it difficult to extrapolate her findings to determine its impact 
on a more macro level. 
Theories of Consolidation in Conflict 
In theory, elections are legitimating institutions because they provide citizens with fair procedures 
for selecting leaders. Research shows that when individuals believe decision-making procedures are 
56 Mattes, 194 
57 Later called "active learning" in the AJPS article of 2007 
58 Ibid, 195 
59 Diamond 1994, 212 
60 Analysis of round 1 of the Afrobarometer found that only 1 in 10 citizens firstly associate elections with democracy. 











fair, they tend to be more satisfied with the leaders overseeing the process and more accepting of 
the outcomes of the process-even when the outcomes are deemed undesirable.62 Due to the 
prominent role the selection of leaders play in developing democracies, elections playa large role in 
both consolidation through institutionalization, as well as the consolidation through legitimization. 
The consolidation through institutionalization theory suggests that democracy is a function of the 
institutions that are built. Democratic consolidation then, is the result of citizens and elites engaging 
with democratic institutions, learning the rules of the game, and adjusting their behaviour to reflect 
more democratic traits. Lindberg's analysis supported this line of reasoning by finding that the level 
of consolidation is closely correlated to the number of elections held. In other words as citizens and 
elites participate in elections they become more accustomed to democratic institutions and rules 
and respond by both increasing the support for democracy and behaving more democratically. Most 
importantly Lindberg found it was the process of holding elections that enhanced a country's 
democraticness and was not contingent on the quality of the electoral outcome. 
The legitimation approach suggests that institutions are insufficient for democratic consolidation; 
democracy requires the support of democrats. The idealists believe that democracy will only 
consolidate when electorates believe in or embody democratic characteristics such as tolerance, 
pragmatism, and social trust. The realists believe that democracy will consolidate when the citizenry 
supports and prefers democracy over other authoritarian alternatives to the point that a majority 
demand democracy. As suggested above the process by which democratic regimes build legitimacy 
is through the delivery of political goods which also builds support for democracy. Mattes and 
Bratton's analysis supports this line of reasoning by identifying an active learning model where 
citizens determine their level of support for democracy through their interactions with democratic 
institutions. It follows then that if these interactions are negative, support for the democratic 
regime will diminish. Furthermore if these interactions are with institutions that are by nature 
political such as the judiciary or elections then the impact should be significant. Thus elections, 
being a political good and one that almost all citizens have experience with in developing 
democracies, should have a sizeable impact on how citizens shape their attitudes towards 
democracy, and the prospects for democratic consolidation. 
In sum then Lindberg finds that elections as an institution can induce democratic behaviour and 
achieve higher levels of freedom, regardless of the quality of the electoral outcome. Whereas 
Mattes and Bratton suggest that the quality of the election does matter. They found that citizens 











determine both their satisfaction with and support for democracy based on the delivery of political 
goods, overall performance of the regime, and/or interaction with democratic institutions. Given 
that elections have the potential to play such a prominent role in both theories of consolidation, it is 
critical to determine if in fact electoral quality influences public support for democracy and thus has 











Chapter 2 Research Design 
Research Question 
Elections are widely viewed as a singular opportunity to take the temperature or check the progress 
of democratic development in any country. International opinion places great emphasis on how the 
election was carried out and whether the results were accepted peacefully. However scholars such 
as Rustow, Elkin and Lindberg believe elections are important largely because of the democratic 
behaviours they induce among leaders and citizens. Thus the act of having an election where 
citizens participate in the voting process is in and of itself the positive indication of democratic 
health. 
However other scholars would argue, that democratic progress or "health" is better measured by 
the opinions citizens have of both the electoral outcome and the overall state of democracy. Mattes 
and Bratton advocate a methodology that divides public attitudes relevant to democratic health into 
two components: supply and demand. The central question of this study then seeks to address the 
tension between these camps by determining, whether the quality of elections affect citizens 
overall attitude towards democracy as measured by supply and demand. 
Included in this central question above are separate assessments of the possible negative effects of 
flawed elections and the possible positive effect of free and fair elections on mass public opinion. 
For example, do flawed elections adversely affect citizen's support and demand for democracy? Do 
citizens give significant weight to elections in determining how satisfied they are with the way 
democracy works in their country? Or do citizens recognize that since democracy is more than 
simply voting once every four or five years, and thus the electoral effect on perceptions of supply is 
negligible? Answering these questions will also help determine whether there is a relationship 
between the quality of elections and the level of supply and demand; such that countries with poor 
electoral quality also have low levels of supply and demand? 
It is also important to determine whether flawed elections and the opinions they generate act as a 
deterrent to democratic consolidation, as some scholars suggest. Indeed, Larry Diamond suggests 
that a democracy will be not be consolidated until, 2/3 of a country's citizens believe in the 
supremacy or legitimacy of a democratic system. Thus the popular demand for democracy 
component, which measures both people's support for democracy as well as their support for 











Therefore I can examine the effect elections have on popular demand for democracy to determine if 
in fact elections facilitate or impede democratic consolidation. 
Citizen behaviours towards government institutions and their level of democratic participation are 
equally important indicators of democratic health. Indeed, it is important to determine if flawed 
elections contribute towards popular disengagement from government officials and representatives 
or make citizens more apathetic and less likely to participate in democratic institutions. Similarly it 
will be equally important to determine if free and fair elections increase legitimacy, and contact 
between citizens and government officials or elected representatives. 
Hypothesis 
I believe that flawed elections reduce the level of perceived supply of democracy and to a lesser 
extent a free and fair election will increase the level of perceived democratic supply. In other words 
a flawed election will have a larger impact than a free and fair election. I believe that after holding 
constant for the delivery of other political goods, the effect of elections on perceived supply of 
democracy will remain. The data will show that elections make the largest impact on whether or 
not citizens believe democracy is being supplied compared to other political or economic indicators. 
Thus I believe that the level of supply will be strongly correlated with the level of electoral quality. 
I believe that flawed elections will also reduce the level of democratic demand (albeit to a lesser 
degree than flawed elections reduced the level of perceived supply of democracy.) Moreover 
repeated flawed elections will have an increasingly negative impact on demand. In this way 
electoral outcomes can impact the consolidation process. 
Furthermore in most developing democracies in Africa, an election is the seminal opportunity for 
citizens to exercise their democratic rights or test the democratic credentials of the government. 
Most citizens have limited access to information about the government or their democratic rights, 
thus they have little else besides elections to inform their opinions. This theory supports the idea 
that supply will reflect the impact of a flawed election more so than democratic demand. I believe it 
takes time for citizens to develop an internal yardstick, and that it takes repeated institutional failure 
for citizens to begin rejecting democracy and be willing to accept other forms of government. As I 
once heard from citizen of Northern Uganda following the 2006 election, "I do not know if I want 
much more of this democracy." 63 
63 The author conducted interviews with political parties, civil society leaders, and local activists as part of a baseline 











These hypotheses are supported by research that shows that citizens base their opinion on the 
delivery of "political goods," As was discussed in the earlier literature review both Diamond, Rose et 
aI., as well as Mattes and Bratton found that citizens base their opinions of democracy on the 
delivery of political goods or getting the small things right. In other words democratic support or 
perceived democratic supply is independent of economic growth or pocket book issues such as 
housing, job opportunities, or the availability of consumer goods. Instead they suggests that 
perceived democratic supply is most closely associated with freedoms; of choice, of speech, 
associated political rights, and the fairness of elections. Since a flawed election is stark example of 
the government's inability to safe guard citizen's political rights and ensure the legitimacy of the 
voting process, then it should reduce both demand for democracy and perceived supply of 
democracy. 
Definitions 
The three key variables or concepts in this study are "supply of democracy," "demand for 
democracy," and "electoral quality.,,64 Both supply and demand are aggregates of a number of 
responses to survey questions, whereas electoral quality is determined by the response to a single 
question. 
Supply and Demand 
The concepts of Supply of Democracy and Demand for Democracy arose out of a need to better 
understand African's view democracy. By segmenting African's views of democracy, scholars and 
researchers are able gain a more nuanced understanding of how public opinion influences 
democratic growth and how democratic institutions, actions, or processes influence public opinion. 
Unlike autocracy or other regime types, in a democracy, public opinion and public sentiment 
towards the regime and government is critical for consolidation and stability.65 
The process of consolidation through legitamation suggests that support for the regime and support 
for democracy is contingent on the delivery of democratic goods such as civil liberties, maintaining 
law and order, adjudicate equitably, or delivering public services.66 The component, perceived 
supply of democracy, is designed to determine if citizens believe that the political institutions and 
elites are delivering these democratic goods, and how satisfied they are with democracy in their 
country.67 "(satisfaction) refers to an empirical assessment of the concrete performance of an actual 
64 In this study I use electoral quality and "free and fair" interchangably 
65 Mattes and Bratton, 192 
66 Fukuyama 2005, Hunting 1968 











regime./I 58 Indeed regardless of what political commentators, academics, or experts believe about 
the performance ofthe regime and adherence to democratic principles; public opinion or judgement 
of the regime performance is ultimately what matters when measuring consolidation. 
Perceived democratic supply then is a measure of satisfaction with the way democracy works in 
their country plus the recognition of being in a democracy. Perceived supply measures (1) the 
extent of democracy by asking citizens to determine whether 'the way' their country is governed is, 
'on the whole,' 'a full democracy,' 'a democracy with major problems,' or 'not a democracy,' and (2) 
how satisfied they are with the way democracy works in their country.59 In sum a citizen feels fully 
supplied with democracy if they both believe that their country is democratic and they are satisfied 
with the way their country works. A nation of fully supplied democrats would mean that 
government was performing well and citizens believe their governments behaviour is very much in 
line with democratic norms and principles. 
Similarly through the process of legitimation democracies will consolidate only when elites and an 
overwhelming portion of citizens view democracy as the only game in town.70 Thus citizens must 
support democracy above all other forms of government, or specifically demand that they be 
governed by a regime that embraces and acts according to democratic norms and principles for 
democratic consolidation to be successful. For demand Mattes and Bratton denote, "that is 
necessary for committed democrats to profess a preference for democracy, it is not 
sufficient ... democrats must therefore go beyond paying lip service to democracy; they must reject 
real world alternatives./l7l In other words demand for democracy means that citizens would choice 
democracy even given all other regime alternatives. 
Demand then can be measured as support for democracy and rejection of all three forms of 
authoritarianism (one party rule, one man rule, and military rule). To measure this respondents are 
asked a battery of questions along an adopted scale developed by Rose Mishler and Haerpfer,72 The 
four questions that determine level of demand are; firstly which of these statements are you most in 
agreement with; "democracy is preferable to me "It makes no difference to people like me/l or 
"sometimes a non-democratic system is preferable;/I plus rejection of three forms of 
authoritarianism, one party, military and one man rule(dictatorship). 
68 Bratton Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 
69 Mattes and Bratton, 194 
70 Linz and Stepan, 15 













Any determination of "Free and Fair" or electoral quality must take into account more than the 
voting process, but also the environment in which the elections take place. A number of different 
international organizations have developed a set of principles and norms to help election observers 
and domestic monitoring organizations make this determination.73 These standards include: an 
atmosphere of respect for human rights and one that is absent of intimidation; the right of self 
determination and non discrimination; freedom of opinion and expression freedom of association 
and assembly; respect for individual rights and due process of the law. These standards then must 
be applied to both the electoral administration and the political competition. 
In practice this means that electoral administration must be impartial, and transparent in resolving 
election disputes. The electoral body must be seen as legitimate and be allowed to carry out its 
mission without interference. Political contestants must be able to campaign freely, and voters must 
be free to engage the campaigns openly. In many African elections this means that voters may 
engage in political discussions, attend political rallies or meetings without fear of retribution or 
intimation. The organs of the state and the security apparatus must also be impartial and 
professional. This includes determining whether government resources are properly utilized, the 
military is neutral and acting as a professional body, whether the police are acting to maintain order 
and are protecting voters seeking to exercise their civil and political rights, and the judiciary is 
conducting itself impartially and effectively. The news media must also be independent and 
objective, or free to act as conveyors of accurate information and act and as watchdogs over 
government and the political processes. The voting process must be free of violence, but it also 
must be transparent and credible. Every citizen should have their vote counted, and the rule of one 
person one vote must be respected and enforced. Violations in any of these areas compromise the 
credibility of the election and the legitimacy of the elected. 
Although it is unlikely that citizen's think about each one of these components of the electoral 
process, the list above is meant to suggest all the area's that may influence citizen opinion on the 
question of freeness and fairness. In the Afrobarometer the freeness and fairness of elections, or 
electoral quality is measured by the response to a single question: "How would you rate the freeness 
and fairness of the most recent (presidential/parliamentary) election in your country held on 
(specific date). In some countries "freeness and fairness," was replaced by "honest or dishonest." 
73 Some organizations include, National Democratic Institute, IFES, the Carter Center, IDEA, Human Rights 











Staffan Lindberg however, has developed a system that takes into account each one of the 
components mentioned above in a systematic process to determine the quality of an election. 
Indeed, Lindberg's grading system compiles data on 10 different indicators. These ten indicators are 
separated into three categories or "three qualities;" political participation, competition, and 
legitimacy.74 Lindberg assigns each indicator a numerical score after analyzing information from 
domestic monitoring organizations, academic sources, and both local and international newspapers. 
Impressively less than 5% of the 5,568 values entered in the dataset utilize less than three sources.75 
After compiling this data Lindberg is able to assign each election a numerical score for freeness and 
fairness. 
He scores, " the freedom and fairness of an election in four ordinal categories: "No, not at all" when 
elections were wholly unfair and obviously a charade orchestrated by the incumbent regime, "No, 
irregularities affected outcome" when the elections had a legal and practical potential to be free and 
fair but there were numerous flaws and serious frauds that affected the result; "Yes, somewhat" 
when there were deficiencies either unintended or organized but they did impact the outcome of 
the election; and "Yes, entirely" when elections were free and fair although there might have been 
human errors and logistical restrictions on operations. When distinguishing between flawed 
electoral processes and essentially acceptable ones in binominal fashion, the first two categories are 
collapsed into flawed while the later two were grouped as "free and fair." 76 
Measurement 
At the individual level the Afrobarometer categorized the responses to supply and demand on a 4 
point scale, I then recoded them on a 5 point scale with responses that could be considered "more 
democratic" on the upper end and less democratic answers were on the low end of the scale with 
"don't know" or ambivalent responses occupying the middle. I recoded the responses to a five 
points scale to better differentiate democratic responses, un- democratic responses, and 
indifference or ambivalence. In most cases recoded responses of 4 and 3 were considered 
democratic responses, whereas 1 and 0 were considered less democratic responses. Two was often 
a middle ground expressing ambivalence, unfamiliarity, or a response that was slightly less than 
supportive of democracy. 
74 The 10 indicators by quality are: Political Participation; 1) voter turnout 2) opposition participation 3) autocratic guard 
gone. Competition 4) winner's share of votes 5) largest party's share of seats 6) second party's share of seats 7) turnover of 
power. Legitimacy 8) loser's acceptance of results 9) peaceful 10) electoral regime survival. 
75 Lindberg 2006 45-47 











The responses gauging free and fairness were also coded on a four point scale to match the Expert 
scale. On the scale the higher the number the greater the respondent thought the level of free and 
fair was in the most recent election. On both scales "4" indicates an election that was completely 
free and fair, "3" indicates an election that somewhat free and fair, "2" indicates an election that 
was somewhat flawed and "1" indicates an election that completely flawed or not free. 
Responses that were classified as "refused" to answer, "didn't understand," or "didn't know" were 
all recoded to the median point or to the response that expresses indifference. In most cases, such 
as all questions that are aggregated for supply and demand, this was a "2.,,77 Although each of these 
three types of responses (don't know, didn't understand, don't know) are different it is difficult to 
make assumptions about the "true intention," of the respondent and flush out the differences in 
meaning between "don't know," and "refused." This is especially true for a dataset that spans 18 
countries. For example someone in Zimbabwe who refuses to answer might do so out of fear for 
repercussions, whereas in a more open and tolerant society like Botswana the motivation could 
simply be confusion. For the majority of the data the combination of these responses rarely exceeds 
3.5% , and thus the recoding of the responses has a negligible effect on the aggregate indicators. 
The instances that the responses for these three categories exceed 10%, will be discussed in greater 
detail in the data analysis. Missing data which makes up less than 1% in nearly all responses was left 
as missing.78 
Following the recoding each country receives a composite mean score for supply and demand for 
each round of Afrobarometer surveys. Each country also receives a composite "free and fair" mean 
score based on the most recent election held in that country. 
In addition to the graduated scale I also created a binomial version of responses to each question 
such that democratic responses are coded "1" and everything else is coded a "0." (This includes 
non-democratic responses, ambivalent responses, refused answers, and responses which express 
don't know.) Missing data is left as missing. In most cases the scores of 4 and 3 are recoded a 1 and 
all other responses are coded a O. Using this scale the country score is not a mean, but the percent 
77 In the rare case where the response expressing indifference or ambivalence was a "1" on the original scale, each of the 
three categories "don't know," "refused to answer," and "don't understand" were also recoded to a "1" These cases are 
almost always ones that ask for "the number of times you did X." In these cases "many times" was a 4, "sometimes" was a 
3, "once," was a two, and "never" was a zero. For these the mid-point or the point between participating and not 
participating was a "1." See appendix for specific questions. 
78 This methodology was used by Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi in their research. For a complete discussion on their 











of respondents that answered in support of democracy or a "1" in each question. This "absolute 
percent" score then can be thought of as the percent of "committed democrats."79 
The absolute percent scale is useful in that it provides an easily understandable way to determine 
the significance of results. For example if demand for democracy in Lesotho falls from 2.9 to 2.4 on 
the average mean scale it is not readily apparent that drop is unless compared to say other countries 
on the same scale. However a drop from 60% to 52% on the absolute percent scale can be 
understood and utilized easily by almost anyone. 
Research Type 
I will use both a Cross Sectional and Longitudinal approach to measure the effect of flawed elections 
on support for democracy at a macro level. The Cross Sectional approach examines public opinion in 
18 countries in two distinct time periods: July 1999-January 2001 and March 2005-February 2006. 
The goal is to examine whether elections that were held immediately before one of the two rounds 
of surveys, influence public opinion. The longitudinal approach examines whether elections cause a 
change in public opinion from July 1999 through February 2006. The longitudinal approach uses 
both elections and countries as unit of analysis, and examines their effect at the macro-level over 
time; whereas the cross sectional approach only utilizes elections as the unit of analysis. 
Cases or Units 
I will examine all elections that take place within the range of the three rounds of Afro Barometer 
survey, from 1996 to 2005. Thus for elections held prior to 1999 or that were captured in the first 
round of survey data, this study examines elections in 12 countries. For elections after 1999 this 
study looks at elections in 18 countries. 
I will examine each of the 16 countries for which there are at least two rounds of Afro Barometer 
data.80 I will measure changes in supply and demand over the 2 or 3 rounds of AB data. I will also 
separate the 16 countries into 2 groups, those that have held at least one flawed election and those 
that have had only free and fair elections than flawed over the survey period. 
79 For a complete list of recoded responses see "Table 1.0 Recodes" 
80 These countries are South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Mali, 











Number of Units 
Although nearly 260 elections took place in Africa between 1989 and 2007, this analysis will focus on 
the approximately 33 elections whose effects were captured by the Afro Barometer. Discrepancies 
may stem from the lack of uniformity of time frame between the election and survey administration. 
Most elections however (21) occurred within 1.5 years of an AB survey. 
At the country level I will focus on each country (16) that has been surveyed at least two times, and 
have carried out a minimum of one election. 
Level of Analysis 
My focus is on the aggregate level of perceived supply of democracy and demand for democracy for 
both the cross sectional and longitudinal approaches. I do not differentiate between individual 
winners or losers, level of education, gender, or other demographics. I am justified in doing this 
because most indicators of consolidation by public opinion are focused on the overall level of 
national support demonstrated by the masses.81 
Method of Comparison 
Firstly in order to determine the validity of the AB data, free and fair as a mean score (FF mean) will 
be compared to free and fair as an absolute percent score (FF absolute percent). The goal is 
determine whether both scales are telling similar stories and to determine if there advantages or 
disadvantages to using either scale. Second both of these scales will be compared to the Expert 
scores (FF expert). A correlation between the Expert Score and the FF mean or FF absolute percent 
suggests that people are indeed paying attention to the election and citizens across the 18 countries 
examined in this study are able to tell a free and fair election from a flawed one. 
Once the validity of the mass perception indicators has been established, this study will then seek to 
examine cross sectional data to assess the relationship between the quality of an election and the 
levels of supply and demand on a macro or national level. The data set includes 29 elections in 18 
different countries. The mean score and the absolute percent score for electoral quality, supply, and 
demand are derived from responses in Rounds 1 and 3 of the Afrobarometer. In order to 
81 Certain scholars, for lack of more comprehensive data, have looked at small population segments in an effort to 
determine macro level trends in public opinion and support or readiness for democracy. (Gibson and Dutch at residents of 
Russia's Moscow Oblast in 1992 for example) By utilizing Afro Barometer Data I can directly examine a diverse cross 
section of individuals to obtain a better measure of "national," opinion. Furthermore Diamond suggests that 2/3 of the 
population must believe in the legitimacy of democracy to ensure consolidation. He, nor other scholars, ever suggested 
that consolidation requires lower levels of support from different sects of population such as 1/3 of all college educated 
people. To examine small segments of the population would open this analysis to discussion of elite based consolidation, 











determine the effect of electoral quality (X) on supply and demand (V), I will test for co-
variation. This means that where X is lower than the average, V should be lower than the average, or 
vice versa. I may also find that when X is high, V is low (or the inverse). To demonstrate co-variation 
I utilized the Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient, a statistical tool commonly used to 
measure the strength of correlation between two quantitative variables.82 Correlation coefficients 
range from -1.00 to +1.00. A coefficient of -1.00 indicates that there is a perfect negative linear 
relationship between the variables, +1.00 demonstrates a perfect positive relationship. If Pearson's 
is 0 then there is no correlation between the quantitative variables.83 In order to ensure that my 
findings were not the result of random measurement error, I utilized a threshold of statistical 
significance of p $.1 due to the low number of cases. Co-variance will be assessed on both the mean 
score scale as well as the absolute percent scale. 
Where appropriate, regression analysis will also be applied to assess the amount of variance in 
aggregate supply and demand that can be explained by the variance in freeness and fairness of an 
election. A regression analysis will allow us to determine with greater predictive accuracy what the 
level of supply or demand might be in country V based on the quality of the most recent election. 
Due to the small N, I will take into account the standard error of the estimate. The standard error 
will help in determining the ranges of supply and demand based on a specific level of electoral 
quality.84 
The second part of the cross-sectional analysis requires an independent t test to determine if the 
means of supply and demand for flawed elections and free and fair elections differ to a statistically 
significant degree. This methodology divides the cases between flawed elections and free and fair 
elections using the FF expert scale. The FF expert scale is utilized because it is ordinal not ratio level 
data, and it allows me to include four additional elections for which there are no data for the 
popular perception indicators. The null hypothesis for this study is that there is no difference 
between the level of supply or demand between the free and fair group and the flawed group. Once 
again I utilize a threshold of p $.1 due to the low number of cases (33). Furthermore by only 
examining the level of supply or demand or resulting "status" of supply and demand following an 
election I employing "post-only" methodology. Since the elections are sufficiently randomized 
across almost any measure, the cases (elections) will be initially comparable on the dependent 
82 Kranzler, 96 
83 Ibid, 99 











variable- comparable enough to satisfy conventional statistical tests used to evaluate the results. In 
cases like these, ((the only justification for pre-testing is tradition.,,8s 
This study will also examine the effect of flawed elections over time using both elections and 
countries as the unit of analysis. This examination hopes to determine whether countries that had 
at least one flawed election share similarities as a group and if there are marked differences 
between these countries and those that have held only free and fair elections. To do this, I will 
examine changes in supply and demand in the 16 countries for which there are at least two rounds 
of Afrobarometer data. These countries will then be split into those that have held at least one 
flawed election as indicated by any of the three scales. The countries that have held at least one 
flawed election over the course of the 3 rounds of AB survey's include, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Nigeria, 
Malawi, Mali, and Lesotho. The period of examination remains 1996 to 2005. 
Lastly this study will examine the relationship between electoral quality and the change in supply 
and demand. In order to do this I will examine the 15 elections that have Afrobarometer data both 
before and after the election. However this section also utilizes 13 dyads for which there are two 
rounds of Afrobarometer data but no election occurred in the intervening period. This set up lends 
itself readily to a natural experiment, by designating the ((no election" dyads as the control group.86 
In any experimental design subjects are pre-tested in terms of the dependent variable (supply or 
demand), exposed to a stimulus representing the independent variable (elections), and then 
remeasured or post tested in terms of the dependent variable.87 The natural experiment divides the 
electorates in three groups, those that had experienced flawed elections, free and fair elections, and 
no election. The principle method for determining if the means of these three groups differ will be a 
one way ANOVA test for independent samples. A one way ANOVA tests for statistical Significance of 
the differences among the means of two or more groupS.88 It examines the amount of differences 
between the means of the groups, compared with the amount of difference among the individual 
scores in each group.89 
Thus to determine validity, a correlation test will be performed between FF mean, FF absolute 
percent, and the FF Lindberg. To determine the covariance between electoral quality and the level 
of supply and demand, I will utilize the Pearsons product moment coefficent, and a t test of 
85 Babbie and Mouton, 221 
86 Babbie and Mouton 224 
87 Babbie and Mouton, 209 
88 This is similar to the independent T test discussed earlier. While a t test can only examine the difference in mean 
between 2 groups, ANOVA and can test the difference between 2 or more groups 











independent sample means. Similarly to assess causality changes of supply and demand will be 
examined per country. The goal is to determine if there are similar characteristics between those 
countries that have held flawed elections and distinct from those countries that have held free and 
fair elections. Finally this study will also utilize experimental design to determine if electoral quality 
causes a reduction or increase in the level of supply and demand. This natural experiment uses the 
dyads with no election as a control group. A one way ANOVA test will help determine if the 
difference in means is significant. If electoral quality does have a causal relationship with changes in 
supply and demand then this paper will discuss the implications for democratic consolidation. 
Method of Control 
In determining the effect of flawed elections on democratic health as measured by levels of 
perceived supply and demand it is important to control for other variables that might also sway 
people's perception of democracy and how it works in their country. Most prominently Larry 
Diamond argues that people's perception of how democracy works or supply is influenced largely by 
the delivery of political goods. Equally important Mattes and Bratton prove that political goods such 
as rights, liberties, judicial systems, free press have a much greater impact on perceived supply 
compared to economic growth or improvement of economic conditions. Thus to determine if 
elections really do have a strong impact on supply or demand this study I will control for other 
political goods such as performance of the president or corruption as well as the delivery of 











Chapter 3 A Look at Africa in Terms of Elections, Supply, and Demand 
Elections in Africa 
As discussed above, for an election to be considered free and fair the voting process must be 
credible and transparent, and the election environment must allow for competition, and be devoid 
of fear or intimidation. Unfortunately a number of elections in Africa have not met this very high 
bar. This was especially true for elections held in the early 1990s. Researchers found that less than 
half of the elections carried out before 1994 were free and fair, the frequency of elections was 
declining, and that participation of political parties as well as competition between them was poor 
and getting worse.90 When elections were flawed or electoral disputes arose, electoral commissions 
were rarely effective in resolving them, and violence often resulted. 
However examining African elections over the entire period of this study and earlier (1989-2005), we 
find that nearly 60% of elections were judged to be free and fair. 91 On average elections in Africa 
have voter participation higher than 60% of the national population. Competition within free and 
fair elections is healthy with opposition parties participating in 90% of them. Furthermore, between 
1999 and 2003, 30% of elections led to turnover. Unfortunately there is still violence associated 
with most electoral periods. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that the violence is becoming 
more isolated and on smaller scales with fewer victims.92 Studies show that these trends in 
competition and participation are indeed stabilizing, suggesting that earlier pessimism surrounding 
elections in Africa, can be attributed to low number of data points and early democratic growing 
pains.93 
Supply and Demand in Africa 
Although a number of countries in Africa only transitioned to electoral democracy less than 15 years 
ago, citizens of Africa are surprisingly supportive of democracy in the abstract but less willing to 
reject other forms of governance. As discussed previously demand for democracy is measured by 
both support democracy and rejection of three forms of authoritarianism. The first round of 
Afrobarometer surveys (1999-2001) examined 12 countries in Africa and found widespread popular 
support with 70% of respondents agreeing that democracy is preferable to any other form of 
government. Of these twelve countries Lesotho was the clear outlier with only 40% of the 
respondents supporting democracy over any other form of government. However it is not simply 
90 Bratton and Van de Wall 1997, 223 
91 Lindberg 2006, 56 
92 Lindberg 2006, 67 











enough to want democracy in the abstract, citizens must view democracy as the only game in town 
and thus must also reject alternative forms. Afrobarometer surveys have examined the rejection of 
at least three alternative forms of rule; one man or dictatorship, one party, and military rule. In the 
twelve Round 1 countries 80% of respondents also rejected military and one man (dictatorship) rule. 
There is slightly more tolerance for one party rule (69% rejection) but not by much. A key point here 
is that more than 40% of respondents did not reject one of the three forms of non-democratic rule. 
In other words a significant number of Africans were willing to tolerate one of three forms of non-
democratic government. 94 This reduces the overall demand component, or the percent of 
committed democrats to 44.6%. 
Absolute Percent Demand 
1999-2001 2003-2004 
AB Round 1 AB Round 2 
Benin 
Botswana 58.01% 42.08% 
Cape Vert 37.38% 
Ghana 56.09% 37.08% 
Kenya 58.80% 
Lesotho 16.40% 30.17% 
Madagascar 
Malawi 47.85% 38.75% 
Mali 41.12% 36.24% 
Mozambique 19.00% 
Namibia 26.12% 19.01% 
Nigeria 64.59% 39.25% 
Senegal 42.98% 
South Africa 29.14% 32.75% 
Tanzania 50.81% 40.07% 
Uganda 35.50% 34.50% 
Zambia 59.10% 49.60% 
Zimbabwe 50.00% 27.80% 
AVERAGE 44.56% 36.59% 
Original 12 AVG 44.56% 35.61% 
2005-2006 





















Following the publication of these 
results some critics felt these same 
conclusions could not be extrapolated 
across other countries in Africa due to a 
bias towards Southern Africa and English 
speaking countries. To make the results 
more inclusive and repeatable round 3 
of the Afro barometer survey included 5 
additional non English speaking 
countries95 only one of which is part of 
mainland southern Africa. However in 
regards to the demand component in 
round 3 we find decrease demand for 
democracy both amongst the original 
twelve countries and the 18 countries in 
aggregate. More importantly however 
there is a small but significant decrease 
in the percent of committed democrats 
from 44.6% to 38.8%. Although support for democracy as an abstract remained constant, rejection 
of both one man rule and military rule decreased by slightly more than 5%. Namibia, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, and Malawi are the four countries with committed democrats below 25%, whereas 
Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Zambia, and Zimbabwe remain the few countries were committed 
democrats are the majority. 
94 Bratton Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 75-81 











Unlike demand, however it is not surprising that perceived supply of democracy in most African 
countries is significantly lower given that most countries have regimes and elites that may not be 
familiar with the mechanisms of democracy or service delivery. From Round 1 of the Afrobarometer 
survey 59% of the respondents said they were satisfied with the way democracy works in their 
country. Only two of the original twelve countries had less than 50% of respondents note they were 
satisfied with the way democracy works; Lesotho and Zimbabwe. On the other hand South Africa 
and Malawi had the highest percent of respondents who voiced their dissatisfaction with 
democracy. 
Absolute Percent Supply 
1999-2001 2003-2004 
AB Round 1 AB Round 2 
Benin 
Botswana 42.83% 46.12% 
Cape Vert 20.43% 
Ghana 43.46% 35.50% 
Kenya 65.97% 
Lesotho 21.33% 36.12% 
Madagascar 
Malawi 28.56% 26.83% 
Mali 19.00% 49.58% 
Mozambique 41.14% 
Namibia 24.85% 50.38% 
Nigeria 15.57% 19.48% 
Senegal 45.07% 
South Africa 21.59% 30.79% 
Tanzania 15.65% 50.04% 
Uganda 19.82% 44.21% 
Zambia 20.20% 36.14% 
Zimbabwe 5.00% 27.17% 
AVERAGE 23.16% 39.06% 
Original 12 AVG 23.16% 37.70% 
2005-2006 





















Critics have suggested that the question 
to determine satisfaction with democracy 
is ambiguous, as it is unclear if the 
respondents are referring to the political 
regime, a set of institutions, or a group of 
policy makers. To mitigate these 
concerns the measure of supply also 
includes recognition of being in a 
democracy. Thus although 59% of 
respondents indicated they were satisfied 
with democracy in round I, only 20% of 
respondents felt they were fully supplied 
with democracy. In round 1 Zimbabwe, 
Nigeria, and Mali all had levels of supply 
below 20%, whereas Botswana and 
Ghana were above 40%. No country 
scored above 50%.96 Without doing very 
much heavy lifting it would certainly not 
be hard to make a case that Zimbabwe and Nigeria were and remain two of the most poorly 
managed countries in Africa whereas Ghana and Botswana are routinely thought of as two of 
Africa's best managed countries. 
Round 3 Afrobarometer data includes the six additional countries discussed earlier for demand in 
addition to the 12 original countries. By 2004 levels of supply had improved dramatically across 
Africa on average. In round 3 nearly 38% of respondents felt satisfactory supplied. Zimbabwe and 











Nigeria continue to hold the dubious honour of lowest number of respondents satisfied with the way 
democracy works in their country, whereas Ghana, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa all had a 
majority of respondents feel fully supplied with democracy. Both Mali and South Africa showed the 
greatest improvement in percent of respondents who felt fully supplied. 
In sum then supply and demand for democracy have gone in opposite directions with time. In most 
countries demand has remained relatively stable with a small but significant overall drop across 
Africa. Supply, however, has shown a much greater improvement, although on average most 
Africans still do not feel adequately supplied with democracy. It is especially interesting to note the 
cases of particular countries. Zimbabwe and Nigeria for example show the lowest levels of supply 
but some of the highest levels of demand. Whereas countries such as Ghana and Botswana show 
high and improving levels of both supply and demand. It is equally interesting to note countries like 
Mali which had relatively stable levels of demand over all three rounds but one of the largest 
increases in percent of respondents who felt adequately supplied with democracy. 
Similar to supply, elections in Africa have on average improved in terms of free and fairness as 
measured by the composite index score designed by Lindberg. Participation by both voters and 
opposition parties is relatively high when compared to earlier elections in Africa and certainly in 
other parts of the world. Frequency of elections has not declined but it does fluctuate from year to 
year, which emphasizes the importance of examining electoral trends with a long lens. This study 












Chapter 4 Validity 
Before examining the relationship between electoral quality and perceived supply of, and demand 
for democracy we need to determine the validity of the electoral quality scale as measured by 
popular perception. 97 The goal of this section is to determine if people are in effect paying attention 
to the quality of the election and its outcome; do they "know what they are talking about." To 
establish validity, the popular perceived free and fairness mean and absolute percent scores will first 
be compared to each other and then to the expert four point scale, taken from Lindberg's analysis. 
Comparing The Two Popular Perception Scales of Free and Fair 
Initially it is important to establish that both the FF mean and the FF absolute percent are strongly 
correlated and "telling a similar story." Furthermore it is equally important to determine for which 
cases or elections the scales seem to be in disagreement and why. This will help to determine the 
validity of each scale and give their scores greater meaning. Correlation analysis indicates that there 
is a strong correlation between the FF mean or mean score assigned by citizens and the FF absolute 
percent or percent of people who thought the election was largely free and fair. The Pearson's 
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Graph 4.2 Electoral Quality with line of best fit 
In graph 5.1 the additional two lines of division at x= 3 and y =.5 line are an effort to divide the cases 
between free and fair versus flawed on both axes. Initially it makes sense to divide the cases 
between those with FF mean above and below 3, based on the fact that people who gave responses 
97 The data points for each country come from round 1 and round 3 of Afrobarometer surveys. For the most part round 1 
surveys were completed between 1999 and 2001, capturing elections between 1996-2001. Round 3 was conducted 
between 2003 and 2005 and captures election from 2002 to 2005. Each of the three variables, (electoral quality, supply, 
and demand) has been measured on graduated five point scale with a resulting mean score; and on a binary scale with a 











above 3 considered the election more or less free and fair where as those that gave responses of 2 
or less, considered the election more or less flawed. Similarly by dividing elections between those 
that received more than 50% and those that received less, I am suggesting that for an election to be 
considered free and fair at the national level at least a majority of people must think it was. Thus 
all elections should be either in quadrant 2 or 4, as most of them are. However there are a few 
elections that are in quadrant 1 namely Lesotho 1998, Ghana 1996, Mali 1997, Malawi 1999. 
Interestingly Lesotho 1998, Malawi 1999, and Ghana 1996 are subsequent elections following flawed 
elections, suggesting that there may be lingering effects of flawed elections on electoral 
expectations. The presence of Mali 1997 in quadrant 1, however, might be the residual effect of a 
split in the quality of the two polls that were held roughly 3 weeks apart, with the parliamentary poll 
being fair(er) than the presidential poll. Since the survey was administered more than 3 years after 
the election some citizens might remember the elections as a single period, instead of separate 
elections, which creates the discrepancy. 
Thus although the correlation between the absolute percent and graduated scale over the 29 
elections remains strong, the presence of a handful of discrepancies is equally revealing. The data 
here suggests that if and when an election can be deemed free and fair on one of the scales but 
deemed flawed on the other it is likely to be a direct result of a previous flawed election, suggesting 
that a flawed election still effects electoral expectations in the subsequent election cycle. However 
this does not mean that all subsequent elections after a failed election will produce discrepancies 
between the free and fair and flawed. Furthermore, based on presence of outliers with a mean 
score between 2.5 and 3, it could be argued that the mean score that is equivalent to the 50% cut off 
on the FF absolute percent scale should be closer to 2.5 than 3. Indeed a majority of citizens might 
still have believed that the election was free and fair (equivalent to responses of 3 and 4) yet the 
presence of enough people who respond with "don't know," (equivalent to a score of 2) pulls the 
aggregate score down. 
Despite these select cases the significant correlation between the FF absolute percent score and the 
FF mean score tell us that each scale is equally valid as a predictor of free and fair in relation to each 
other. Discrepancies between the absolute percent score and the mean score indicates that for 
some elections where the FF mean was less than 3 a majority of citizens still believed it was free and 
fair. These outlying elections that exhibit this discrepancy can be determined by the quadrant they 
are in as well as the distance away from the line of best fit. Furthermore nearly all of these elections 
are subsequent elections following a flawed election. This suggests that flawed elections have an 











in the following election cycle. Given that some elections appear as free and fair on the mean scale 
but flawed on the absolute percent scale and vice versa it may be informative to use both scales 
throughout the rest of the analysis. This is especially true given the low "N" or number of flawed 
elections, which allows one election to have a sizeable effect on the overall mean and correlation. 
Comparing Popular Perceptions of Free and Fair with the Expert 
Measure of Free and Fair 
Yet this analysis only validates the accuracy of the mean score and the absolute percent score in 
relation to each other. Although important, it may be more helpful to determine if in fact people are 
paying attention to the election by comparing both scales to a scale derived and assigned by a team 
of experts. As discussed previously, Lindberg has created an expert score to assign each of these 
elections a free and fairness score ranging from 1 to 4 with 3 and 4 being scores of a free and fair 
election whereas 1 and 2 convey a flawed election. As discussed in Chapter 2 these scores are based 
on numerous reports from various sources divided into ten different indicators. If there is a 
correlation between the mass opinion on the aggregate level and the expert opinion we can 
conclude that citizens are paying attention to electoral outcomes and can tell the difference 
between a free and fair and a flawed election just as well as any academic or electoral expert. 
Free and Fair Expert Free and Fair Free and Fair 
Mean Absolute Percent 
I rregu la rities Mean 2.32 39% 
Affect Outcome N 5 5 
2 STO 0.4 15% 
Somewhat Fair 
Mean 3.08 71% 
3 
N 20 20 
STO 0.22 9% 
Mean 3.27 81% 
Completely 
N 3 3 Free 4 
STO 0.1 5% 
Table 4.1 Mean Scores of Popular Perception Index within Expert Scores 
A comparison of the expert scores to both the FF mean and FF absolute percent is best displayed by 
a box and whisker or simple scatter plot. The strength of the correlation will be demonstrated by 
Pearson's correlation coefficient. In both graphs 4.3 and 4.4 the box plot and simple scatter plot 
show a well defined and separate range of Free and Fair mean scores for those elections that were 











flawed or "irregularities affected outcome" on the Expert scale is equivalent to 2.32 with a standard 
deviation of .40 whereas the mean score for elections that were coded as "yes somewhat (fair)" on 
the Expert scale is FF mean 3.08 with a standard deviation of .22. Since a score of 4 is the highest an 
election can receive from an individual the mean FF score is slightly below a 4 at 3.27 (see table 4.1). 
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Similarly in graphs 4.5 and 4.6 the box plot and simple scatter also show a clear defined range of FF 
absolute percent scores for those elections that were coded slightly flawed or "irregularities affected 
outcome," on the Expert scale and those that were coded mostly fair or "yes somewhat." The 
absolute percent scores however display a greater range and variance than the mean scores. The 
average percent of people who believe the election was free and fair when the experts believed 
"irregularities had affected outcome" is 39% with a standard deviation of 15.3% whereas the 
average percent of people who believed it was free and fair when the experts believed it was a 
"somewhat" free and fair is nearly 71% with a standard deviation of 8.9%. These absolute percent 
scores give more grounded meaning to the Expert scores. For every election that the experts deem 
as flawed (2), roughly 1/3 of the population thinks it was mostly free and fair. For every election 
that the experts deem as "mostly free and fair" (3), roughly two thirds of the population thinks it 
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Graph 4.5 FF Simple Scatter plot FF Absolute Percent FF Expert Graph 4.6 Box Plot FF Absolute Percent and FF Expert 
Zambia 1996 is the only clear outlier when comparing both the FF mean and FF absolute percent 
scores to the Expert scores. Zambia 1996 is likely an outlier due to the IIcontroversy" surrounding 
the exclusion of former president Ken Kaunda. Indeed at the time many international monitoring 
organizations and electoral experts were outraged when the Zambian electoral commission did not 
allow former president Ken Kaunda to participate. These same organizations however, noted that 
the polling of the actual election was mostly transparent and peaceful. Average Zambian citizens 
however, felt the overall election was largely free and fair in spite of President Kaunda's exclusion 
largely because they felt his presence was unlikely to affect the outcome.98 
FF Expert FF Mean FF Absolute Percent 
FF Expert 1 0.763* 0.775* 
FF Mean 0.763* 1 0.982* 
FF Absolute Percent 0.775* 0.982* 1 
'Correlation significant at .1 level 
N =29 for all correlations 
Measures of Association 
Eta Eta Squared 
FF absolute percent * FF Expert .833 .694 
FF mean * FF Expert .808 .652 
Table 4.2 Correlation Analysis between the 3 scales 
Despite the presence of Zambia 1996 both the absolute percent scores and the mean scores display 
a strong correlation with the Expert scores (see table 4.1). The strength of association between the 











expert score and popular perception scales is further validated by the eta squared value of .808 FF 
mean to .833 FF absolute percent (table 4.2). This analysis suggests that people do pay attention to 
electoral quality and that they are by and large as accurate in their assessments of electoral quality 
as "experts." If the expert score is the standard bearer for quality of elections then it seems that 
both the mean score and the absolute percent are equally useful indicators to compare with supply 
and demand based on the strength of Pearson's r and eta. Thus given the relative equivalency all 
three scales will continue to be utilized throughout the study to determine the relationship between 











Chapter 5 Does Electoral Quality Matter? Cross Sectional Analysis 
Electoral Quality and Supply 
The goal ofthis section is to determine if electoral outcomes influence how people perceive the 
supply of democracy. As previously discussed in chapter 2, supply is measured by satisfaction with 
democracy and recognition of being in one, such that the highest response (4) indicates that the 
respondent believes that they live in a completely democratic country and that they are very 
satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. I hypothesized that after publics 
participated in a flawed election citizens might revaluate and downgrade how they perceive the 
supply of democracy. Elections are often the defining democratic activity or feature in many African 
countries, thus they would have a disproportionate affect on how satisfied citizens are with the way 
democracy works in their country. This sub section investigates that hypothesis by examining the 
relationship between supply and the quality of electoral outcomes. 
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Graph 5.2 Electoral Quality and Supply Abs % scale Graph 5.3 Electoral Quality and Supply w/out 1
st 
elections 
Initial analysis shows that there is a strong and significant correlation between electoral quality and 
perceived supply of democracy. Graph 5.1 supports the hypothesis and shows countries with 
flawed elections having low levels of perceived supply; flawed elections in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, 
Malawi, and Zambia are all on the lower end of the spectrum. The correlation between electoral 
quality and supply on the absolute scale, however, is somewhat weaker. From figure 5.2 it appears 
that there is a group of elections that are distorting the relationship between perceived supply and 
electoral quality. This group that has high levels of electoral quality but low levels of supply includes 
cases from Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. A common characteristic between these 
countries is the timing of the transition to democracy in the early 1990s meaning that these data 
points only represent their first or second election. 
Scale Pearson's RI\2 
Mean 0.785 0.616 
Absolute Percent 0.581 0.338 
Absolute w/out First Elections 0.699 0.487 
.. 
*AII significant at the p:5.1Ievel 
Table 5.1 Correlation Analysis of Electoral Quality and Supply 
However, if we remove all of the first elections the standard error decreases while the strength and 
significance ofthe regression coefficients improve (see table 5.1). Thus, as seen by the group of 
cases below the norm in figure 2.2, first elections on average do not correlate well with the rest of 
the cases. This could be due to the fact that first elections often "announce" the arrival of a new 
democratic regime and thus citizens have almost no information or experience to judge both the 
level of democratic supply or a basis to judge the free and fairness of election. As time goes on, 
however, citizens can use their experience with previous elections and participation in democratic 
activities to make more informed judgements. 
Post Only Test 
As discussed in the methodology, a post only examination of supply of and demand for democracy 
following an election can help determine if publics adjust their view of democracy after participating 
in a free and fair or flawed election. To determine if the level of supply at the national level is 











participated in a free and fair one I use the FF expert binary classification as my break point as it is an 
ordinal scale and allows me to bring in 4 additional elections.99 
N Mean STD Significance 
Free and Fair Mean 
Flawed 7 1.91 0.45 
0.033 
Free & Fair 26 2.63 0.22 
Free and Fair Absolute Flawed 7 16.16% 7.48% 
Percent Free & Fair 26 35.21 % 14.54% 0.019 
Table 5.2 Independent T Test of Supply 
An independent t test reveals that there is a significant difference between how supplied electorates 
feel after a flawed elections or a free and fair election. Indeed the t test provides further evidence 
that how supplied citizens feel with democracy is closely linked to the quality of the election they 
most recently participated in. Or in other words, at the national level electoral outcomes produce 
different and distinct levels of supply. Furthermore the difference in the means of supply between 
those associated with flawed elections and those associated with free and fair elections was shown 
to be significant when using FF expert as the break point in either the FF mean or FF absolute 
percent scale. This evidence supports the correlation analysis which indicated that there is a 
relationship between electoral quality and level of supply. 
Electoral Quality and Demand 
Having found a strong relationship between electoral quality and supply, I will apply similar 
methodology to determine if electoral quality influences the level of democratic demand. As 
previously discussed democratic demand is determined by the level of support for democracy and 
rejection of three different forms of authoritarianism (one party, military, and dictatorship). I 
hypothesized that flawed elections would be associated with low levels of demand and free and fair 
would be associated with higher levels of demand, and this would be especially true for countries 
that have held more than 1 flawed election. This sub section will test this relationship through 
correlation analysis, and using post only methodology. Similar to supply the goal is to determine if 
there is a relationship and the extent of the relationship between the quality of an election and how 
fervently citizens demand democracy. 
99 Further analysis using a FF mean break point of 2.68 and a FF absolute percent break point of 45% shows that the scales 
rarely produce different results. Tables to this effect can be found in the appendix. As seen in Chapter 3 correlation 
analysis between FF mean and FF expert revealed that flawed elections had a FF mean of 2.3 with a standard deviation of 
.38. Thus by making the break point at 2.68 instead of 3 the accuracy of dividing free and fair elections from flawed 











Unlike supply, however, we find no significant cross sectional relationship exists between the quality 
of the election and public demand for democracy with correlation analysis revealing a Pearson's r of 
-.102 on the FF mean scale. A negative r implies that the more free and fair an election is the less 
people demand or support democracy. This is the inverse of what I hypothesized. Examining the 
relationship between FF absolute percent and demand absolute percent reveals a similar story. The 
correlation is both weak and insignificant with Pearson's correlation coefficient being -.058. Indeed, 
as seen in the graphs below, less than 5% of the variance in demand being explained by the variance 
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Table 5.3 Correlation Analysis Electoral Quality and Demand 
Post Only Test 
I also examined the relationship between electoral quality and demand by using post only 
methodology to determine if there is a significant difference in demand for democracy amongst 
electorates that experienced a flawed election and those that experienced a free and fair election. 
Identical to the supply I utilize an independent t test, with FF expert as the break point to make this 
determination. Neither the FF absolute percent nor the FF mean scale reveals a significant 











demand for democracy between electorates that have experienced a flawed election and those that 
experienced a free and fair election. 
Free and Fair Mean 
Free and Fair Absolute Percent 
USing FF expert as the break pOint 




Free & Fair 26 
Flawed 7 
Free & Fair 26 





40.78% 13.39% 0.902 
The relationship between supply and electoral quality then is well established; however how 
significant is electoral quality in relation to other variables that influence supply? Based on literature 
cited in Chapter 1 the delivery of political goods not economic goods should have the greatest 
impact on satisfaction with and support for democracy. Of those political goods, performance of the 
president, and civil liberties were shown to have the strongest influence on support for 
democracy.loo Further studies on regime performance and the delivery of political goods have found 
that the presence or perception of high levels of corruption can deteriorate satisfaction with 
democracy regardless of the presence of certain civilliberties.101 The delivery of economic goods or 
economic performance was also show to have an effect on satisfaction with democracy although to 
a lesser degree than other political goods. Thus I use presidential performance, economic 
performance, and corruption as control variables to determine the strength of the relationship 
between electoral quality and perceived supply of and demand for democracy. 
Examining the co-variance between these three variables and supply I found that each control 
variable is significantly correlated with supply at almost the same level as electoral quality. Indeed 
performance of the president and economic performance have just as strong a relationship with 
perceived democratic supply; all three have a person's correlation coefficient near .800. Utilizing 
correlation analysis to test the relationship between electoral quality and supply while controlling 
for these three variables individually I find that the relationship remains but is diminished. From 
100 Afrobaromenter working paper 36 further investigated the relationship between satisfaction with democracy and the 
delivery of political goods, specifically performance of the president and performance of parliament. 












table 5.5 it is apparent that holding constant for performance of the president has the largest impact 
as it reduces the strength of the relationship between electoral quality and supply from .785 to .485. 
Whereas holding constant for economic performance and corruption individually, has a smaller 
impact reducing the relationship between electoral quality and supply to .643 and .654 respectively. 
This suggests that presidential performance and electoral quality seem to influence the perceived 
level of supply in similar ways as it does not diminish the direct relationship entirely. 
Free and 
Fair 
Direct Correlation With 
Supply 0.785* 
Supply and FF Controlling For X 
Controlling for other 3 0.447* 
*Significant at the p:5.1Ievel 
Table 5.5 Correlation Analysis of Supply with Control 
Variables 
Performance Economic 
of President Performance Corruption 
0.788* 0.795* 0.491 * 
0.485* 0.643* 0.654* 
0.212 0.670* -0.159 
I also examined the relationship between freeness and fairness and supply when holding constant 
for the three control variables combined. When doing so I found that the Pearson's coefficient was 
.447 which is near the strength it was when only holding constant for performance of the president. 
This corroborates the fact that presidential performance and electoral quality have a near similar 
effect on perceived levels of democratic supply. 
Unlike the relationship between electoral quality and supply, the relationship between demand and 
electoral quality is almost non-existent. Similar to supply, however, earlier studies showed that 
presidential performance and corruption were two political goods that had the potential to influence 
support for democracy. Furthermore while economic goods weren't as dominant a number of 
studies found evidence that macro economic outlook, as an economic good, was influential in 
determining support for the regime and thus support for the democracy. 
After examining the co-variance between demand for democracy and the three control variables, I 
found that only the relationship between performance of the president and demand for democracy 
was significant. A Pearson's r of -.37 can be interpreted as the worse a president is performing the 
more citizens demand democracy. Similarly when re-examining the relationship between demand 











that a significant relationship emerges. A positive correlation (r = .356) suggest that the relationship 
between presidential performance and electoral quality obscures the relationship between electoral 
quality and demand. Indeed further research might show that in countries with poor presidential 
performance the relationship between electoral quality and demand is strong and significant. 
Free and Performance Economic 
Fair of President Performance Corruption 
Direct Correlation Demand 
And -0.102 -0.37* -0.289 -0.208 
Demand and FF Controlling 
For X 0.356* 0.083 0.039 
Controlling for other 3 0.249 .712* 0.18 -0.085 
*Significant at the p$.llevel 
Table 5.6 Correlation Analysis of Demand with Control Variables 
However when controlling for presidential performance, economic performance, and corruption at 
the same time, I find that there is no relationship between demand and electoral quality. Although 
Pearson's r is .249 it is not significant at the p:S:.1Ievel. 
Chapter 6 Does Electoral Quality Matter? 
A Longitudinal Analysis of Changes in Supply and Demand 
A Natural Experiment 
The goal of this section is to establish a causal relationship between elections and supply of and 
demand for democracy by examining the change in supply and demand over election and non 
election periods. Unlike the last chapter which examined cross sectional data and utilized primarily a 
post-only methodology, this chapter examines the independent variables (supply and demand) both 
before and after the election, or pre and post-testing. Within the data set there are 15 pairs or 
dyads of Afrobarometer data points with an intervening election and 13 pairs of data points with no 
intervening election. This lends itself to a natural experiment where the pairs of data points with no 











demand for democracy would decrease after a flawed election, increase during a free and fair 
election and reflect a smaller change in a period of time where no election occurred. To test this 
hypothesis I use a one way ANOVA test, that similar to the t test, will test for a statistically significant 
difference between the three groups of free and fair, flawed and no election. 
Table 6.1 shows the change in supply for each of the three categories, free and fair, flawed, and no 
election. Substantively the means in this table are very near to what we expected. Pairs of country 
surveys with no intervening election reflect almost no change in the perceived level of supply (-.02), 
flawed elections, however, lead to an average drop in supply of .25 points whereas a free and fair 
election increases the level of supply by an average of .20. A key difference however, between the 
mean scale and the absolute percent scale is that a flawed election leads to an increase by 6% 
whereas a free and fair election leads to an increase by 16% in perceived supply of democracy. On 
further examination, these results imply that a free and fair election almost always leads to an 
increase in the number of people who feel supplied with democracy whereas a flawed election 
might just as likely lead to an increase in the number of people who feel supplied with democracy as 
a decrease. On the other hand given the fact that each country data point is the result of at least 
1200 surveys the standard error is +- 3% thus it is easier to conclude that there is a significant 
difference between the two means. 
Mean STD N ETA 
Free and 
Fair 0.205 0.226 10 
Supply Mean 
None -0.022 0.259 13 
0.162 
Flawed -0.254 0.802 5 
Mean STD N ETA 
Free and 
Fair 15.87% 15.06% 10 
Supply Absolute Percent* 
None -0.86% 15.27% 13 
0.175 
Flawed 6.84% 25.50% 5 
* All significant at the ps.1level 
Table 6.1 Change in Supply after a free and fair, flawed, or no election 
Examining changes in democratic demand in a similar fashion I find that the means (Table 6.2) do in 
fact partially support this hypothesis; flawed elections do produce an average dip in demand (-.18) 











reflect an average decrease in demand of -.037. This might speak to the fact that people expect an 
election to be free and fair when making their assessment of their support for democracy, thus 
having a free and fair election only meets expectation and does not greatly influence their demand 
for democracy. 
Mean STD N ETA 
Free and 
Fair 0.003 0.134 10 
Demand Mean 
None -0.037 0.159 13 
0.1 
Flawed -0.177 0.371 5 
Mean STD N ETA 
Free and 
Fair 1.92% 19.90% 10 
Demand Absolute Percent 
None -1.64% 16.54% 13 
0.08 
Flawed -14.00% 26.28% 5 
Table 6.2 Change In Demand after a free and fair, flawed, or no election 
The low level of significance for both the average change in mean and the average change in 
absolute percent can be attributed to the low number of data points, which allows one country or 
one election to have a disproportionate affect on the standard deviation and thus the significance in 
the difference of the means. For example, examining the change in the mean score of demand for 
the flawed elections, we notice that four out of the five all show a decrease of .1 or more, on the 
scale from 0 to 4, except for Zimbabwe 2005 which shows an increase of 040. If both Zimbabwe 
elections are removed from the dataset, then the difference in means for the change in demand 
between free and fair and flawed becomes significant at the .1 level. More importantly the absolute 
percent falls to -24% and the mean score falls to -.341 for flawed elections. 
It is also important to keep in mind that the low number of data points is the result of using national 
level data or aggregate indicators. Indeed each national level supply and demand data point is 
representative of more than 1,000 individual responses, while the macro level data set only has 18 
data points; the micro level data set has more than 20,000 data points. Testing at the micro-level for 
a difference in means between changes in supply and demand following free and fair, flawed 
elections, and non-election periods reveals nearly identical means as the national level data set but 
at a much higher significance level but weaker association. At the individual level a flawed election 
still results in a decrease in supply mean of .25 whereas a flawed election also results in a decrease 
in demand mean by.23. At the national level supply decreased .25 and demand by .18. However 












This analysis of how the change in supply and demand is influenced by both the presence of 
elections and their quality adds to the evidence that supports elements of the original hypothesis. 
Indeed the link between electoral quality and supply once again proves to be the most resilient 
relationship as demonstrated by the significance and order of magnitude difference between change 
in the supply mean scores following a flawed or free and fair election. Demand does decrease after 
flawed elections (4 out of 5 times), and slightly increases after free and fair elections. However, the 
relationship between free and fairness and demand proves to be more fickle than supply. The low 
number of data points contributes greatly to the low level of significance for all of the ANOVA tests 
and difference of means. Yet, the directional change of supply and demand after free and fair or 
flawed election supports the overall hypothesis. Furthermore the fact that the smallest change 
typically occurred during periods of non-election supports the hypothesis that elections impact the 
health of democracy on the most rudimentary of scales. 
Comparing Countries 
Although the evidence presented above is significant the single largest drawback is the low number 
of data points, particularly for flawed elections. The small N of country level dyads, allows outliers to 
have a disproportionate effects on the mean and the level of significance. As was seen above all of 
the flawed elections led to significant decrease of demand by .25 to .45 on the graduated scale of 0 
to 4, however, Zimbabwe's .45 increase in demand following the disastrous presidential election of 
2005 had a disproportionate influence on the mean and the significance. Furthermore each country 
has its own particular history, and political system as well as other intricacies that may have yet to 
be determined effects. Thus it might be more appropriate to look at changes in supply and demand 
within each country, which allows us to hold country specific factors constant. 
Examining all the countries change in supply on a single graph does little to help us understand the 
effects of flawed elections, instead it is better to divide the countries between those that have held 
at least one flawed elections and those that have held free and fair. I divided the countries using a 
loose definition of a flawed election, to include any country that held a flawed election even if that 
election was prior to the first round of AB data, or wasn't specifically captured by AB dataset. This 
allowed me to include both Lesotho and Mali who held flawed elections in 1998 and 1997 
respectively. As you can see from graphs 6.1 and 6.2 there is a clear difference between the two 
groups. By the third round all the countries that have held only free and fair elections have levels of 
supply above 2.4 whereas all the countries with at least one flawed elections have levels of supply 
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Tanzania 
-~Uganda 
Furthermore all the countries in figure 6.2 show a net increase in supply with the exception of Kenya 
whereas all of the countries in 6.1 show a net decrease in supply, again with the exception of Mali. 
Mali and lesotho are also informative in the sense that they do not fit well in either group, as they 
are the only two countries to have a single flawed election prior to the first round of AB data. (Other 
countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe also held flawed election immediately prior to the first 
round of AB survey, however they also had subsequent flawed elections) The subsequent elections 
in both countries were both Free and Fair which rightly explains why they show an increase in levels 
of supply and their marked difference from the rest of the countries that have held flawed elections 
and continued to have them. Although this data also suggests that flawed elections may influence 
supply beyond a single election cycle, countries such as Mali and Kenya demonstrate that no country 











adjust their support for and satisfaction with democracy following a free and fair election even if the 
previous one was flawed or vice versa. 
Within the countries that have a decreasing level of supply, Zimbabwe as always, is a unique case. It 
shows the most dramatic changes in supply although it has only held flawed elections. This could be 
the result of the timing of the survey in March 2003. According to Chikwana, Sithole, and Bratton 
this was also the time that Jonathan Moyo took over the media or propaganda arm of the 
Zimbabwean government. Furthermore Chikwana and Sithole contend in their 2004 paper, the 
increase in supply or (satisfaction with democracy) can be attributed largely to those that read and 
listened exclusively to government media. Those who didn't read or listen to government media 
continued to feel dissatisfied with the way democracy worked in their country. 102 This helps to 
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Graph 6.3 Changes in Demand for Countries that have held one or more Flawed Elections 
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Graph 6.4 Changes in Demand for Countries with only Free and Fair Elections 
-+-Botswana 








Graphs 6.3 and 6.4 show changes in demand over the three rounds of AB data and are once again 
split between the countries that held free and fair elections and countries that have held flawed 
elections. The difference between the two graphs is not as stark as the difference between graphs 
5.1 and 5.2, however they are informative. Unlike the graphs showing changes in supply which 
showed a clear division both above and below 2.4, there is no clear dividing line for demand. In fact 
a number of countries that have held flawed elections still have higher levels of demand then 
countries that have held only free and fair elections. For example Nigeria and Zambia both have 
demand levels above 3 despite seriously flawed elections whereas Mozambique, Namibia, and South 
Africa have demand levels below three despite holding only free and fair elections. The countries in 
graph 6.3 show significant changes in demand whereas one of the most notable characteristics of 
the graph 6.4 is how marginal the changes are. Indeed, with the exception of Tanzania and Namibia, 
most of the countries in graph 6.4 have slopes that are nearly parallel to the x axis. In Tanzania, 
arguably the most dominant and long standing one party dominant state, decrease in demand is 
likely due to an increase in satisfaction with the way the country works. Indeed the data shows that 
the more Tanzania improved at establishing civil liberties the more people were willing to tolerate 
the current state of affairs or a defacto one party state. 
Mali and Lesotho are once again outliers within the countries that have had flawed elections as both 
show increasing levels of demand whereas the others (except for Zimbabwe) all show declining 
levels of demand. As previously discussed this is likely skewed due to the increasing effectiveness of 











By examining the country as a unit of analysis instead of an election a different set of patterns 
emerge. In terms of supply those countries that have held flawed elections all showed a net 
decrease and all fall below 2.4 (except Mali). Whereas those that have held all free and fair elections 
showed a net increase achieving levels above 2.4 by the 3rd round of the AB survey. Mali and 
Lesotho are unique in the dataset as they are the only country which had a flawed election captured 
by the first round of AB survey and went on to have only free and fair elections. As such their lines 
are almost parallel as they increase significantly from rounds 1 to rounds 2 and then level off. Most 
of the countries that have only free and fair elections show the largest increase between rounds 2 
and rounds 3. In terms of demand, countries with flawed elections share similar characteristics 
amongst themselves as do countries that have held only free and fair. There is however no unique 
break point (such as 2.4 for supply), as the level of demand does not seem to depend on free and 
fair or flawed elections. Instead it is the change in levels of demand that differentiate countries with 
flawed elections and those with free and fair elections. Indeed the greatest changes in demand take 
place in countries that have held multiple flawed elections such as Nigeria and Malawi. Most of the 
countries that have held free and fair elections show relatively little change in demand with the 
exception of Tanzania and Namibia. Both Tanzania and Namibia are countries with dominant one 
party system with only very localized political opposition (Zanzibar and Windhoek). 
Chapter 7 Behavioural Effects 
Although I have demonstrated that flawed elections negatively influence perceived levels of supply 
and demand for democracy, do these changes in perception, also lead to changes in behaviour? For 
example do electorates who become increasingly dissatisfied with democracy, as seen by declining 
levels of supply and/or demand, become less likely to participate in ((democratic activities?" Beyond 
the fact that flawed elections might sway some electorates to reduce their support for democracy or 
entertain ideas of authoritarian regimes, if these same publics are still reaching out to government 
officials, attending demonstrations, or obeying the police then there is less reason to believe that 
flawed elections reduce democratic health. This section aims to determine if flawed elections or 
declining levels of supply and demand lead to a decline in participation or a change in behaviour. To 
investigate these questions, I examined three variables, 1) how often people attend demonstrations, 
2) how often people contact the government and 3) whether or not they believe that the police have 
the right to make everyone obey the law. A mean score was taken for each of the three variables. 
To investigate the relationship between flawed elections, supply of and demand for democracy and 











relationship between electoral quality, supply, and demand. Firstly I use cross sectional data and 
correlation analysis (Pearson's correlation coefficient) to determine if the levels of participation are 
related to the level of electoral quality, supply or demand. Second I examine the change in 
behaviour and the change in supply and demand by setting up a natural experiment between publics 
that experienced no election, a flawed election and a free and fair election. To make this 
determination I utilize a one way ANOVA test to find a statistical difference between the means of 
these three groups. 
Table 7.1 (below) shows the correlation between the 3 behavioural variables, electoral quality, 
supply, and demand, whereas table 7.2 (below) shows the correlation between the change in supply 
and demand and the change in the 3 behavioural variables. The difference between these two 
tables is slight but important. Table 7.1 examines if cases with high levels of supply or demand also 
have high levels of participation. In other words are publics with high levels of perceived supply 
more likely to attend a higher number of demonstrations than publics in countries with low supply. 
Table 7.2 examines if declining levels of supply and demand also leads to declining participation. For 
example if supply falls, does the number of demonstrations attended by the average citizen also 
drop? In table 7.1 the only significant correlation is between demand for democracy and attend 
demonstration with a Pearson's r of -.323. This relationship, however, differs from the original 
hypothesis as it suggests the less electorates demand democracy the more demonstrations they will 
attend. From table 7.2 we find that the only significant correlation is between the change in demand 
and change in number oftimes people contact a government official. In other words as people 
lessen their support for democracy they also reduce the number of times they contact government 
officials. This relationship is also fairly strong as the Pearson's correlation coefficient is .572. 
Table 7.3a and 7.3b shows the difference in means of the change in the three behavioural variables 
over the three categorical dyads of no election, flawed election, and free and fair election. Although 
none of the means are different at a significant level, directionally, the means do support the 
hypothesis that a flawed election leads to a decrease in engagement between citizen and 
government and a decrease in the legitimacy of the police to force citizens to obey the law. 
Absolute Percent Scale Mean STD N ETA 
Free and 
Fair -1.98% 4.00% 8 
Attend Demonstration 
None -2.58% 4.00% 11 
0.295 
Flawed -5.38% 6.38% 5 
Mean STD N ETA 
Obey the law 0.352 












None -2.62% 7.03% 9 
Flawed -6.65% 2.19% 2 
Mean STO N ETA 
Free and 
Fair 1.16% 4.10% 5 
Contact Government Official 
None -2.56% 7.00% 9 
0.325 
Flawed -4.50% -4.50% 1 
Table 7.3a Natural Experiment on the Absolute Percent Scale 
Mean Mean STO N ETA 
Free and 
Fair 0.095 0.133 8 
Attend Demonstration 
None 0.088 0.2 11 
0.089 
Flawed 0.038 0.307 5 
Mean STO N ETA 
Free and 
Fair 0.044 0.136 5 
Obey the Law 
None -0.073 0.239 9 
0.124 
Flawed -0.275 0.205 2 
Mean STO N ETA 
Free and 
Fair 0.038 0.113 5 
Contact Government Official 
None -0.078 0.21 9 
0.106 
Flawed -0.12 1 
Table 7.3b Natural Experiment on the Mean Scale 
Similar to earlier analysis the lack of significance in the difference of means can be largely attributed 
to the lack of data points, however the problem with the three behavioural variables is even more 
acute. Indeed the question to assess how often a respondent contacted a government official was 
not asked in round 1 of the AB survey, and furthermore it was not asked in specific countries such as 
Zimbabwe and Uganda. This reduces the number of data points from 29 to 15 for the "contact a 
government official" variable. Furthermore only one of the 15 dyads captures a flawed election 
damaging the significance of the difference in means test. Similarly there are only 16 dyads for the 
variable "Obey Police," and of those 16 only two capture a flawed election. For these two variables 
then the low number of elections in general and flawed elections in particular, make it challenging to 
draw any definitive conclusions on how electoral quality, supply, or demand influence behaviour. 
The attend demonstration variable, however, has 24 data points, which is nearly as many as was 
used to determine changes in supply and demand at a significant level in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Examining Table 7.3a, flawed elections lead to a 6% decrease in the number of people who had 











number of people attending demonstrations, albeit not as large. Indeed the difference between 
publics that experienced a flawed election and those that experienced a free and fair in the number 
of people who attended demonstrations is small and marginal on the absolute percent scale. 
Further confusing the issue is that the mean scale seems to suggest that for every election more 
people are attending demonstrations regardless of the quality. If we examine the data on a country 
by country basis on the mean scale we see that number of protests or demonstrations attended by 
the average citizen increases from round 1 to round 3 for every country except Zimbabwe regardless 
of the electoral quality (table 7.4). This may lend support to Lindberg's argument that participating 
in democratic activities builds democratic attitudes and thus moving towards institutionalized 
behaviour.103 However the fact that the both the absolute and mean scale reflect marginal changes 
(and in different directions) it is unlikely that electoral quality influences electorates in attending 
demonstrations, given this particular data set. 












country Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Benin 0.97 
Botswana 0.54 0.74 0.84 
Cape Vert 0.75 0.85 
Ghana 0.23 0.29 0.44 
Kenya 0.71 0.70 
Lesotho 0.37 0.36 0.52 
Madagascar 0.56 
Malawi 0.42 0.55 0.81 
Mali 0.21 0.48 0.45 
Mozambique 1.01 
Namibia 0.83 0.67 0.87 
Nigeria 0.19 0.61 0.66 
Senegal 0.87 
South Africa 0.94 0.79 0.93 
Tanzania 0.35 0.93 0.78 
Uganda 0.60 
Zambia 0.47 0.52 0.61 
Zimbabwe 0.99 0.68 0.47 
Table 7.4 Attend Demonstrations by country on the Mean Scale 
Indeed this data set has some incongruencies which might help explain the findings discussed above. 
The first challenge with this is data set is in regards to time. In some countries the survey asked the 
number of protests or demonstrations attended "in the last year," whereas in other countries (Mali, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria in Round 1) it asked "in the last five years." The change in the amount of 
time given for one to "count," their demonstration activity causes even more problems because the 
surveys were taken at varying lengths of time following each election. The time between election 
and survey administration is highly variable from country to country and from round to round 
ranging from 4.5 years to 3 months. If in fact there are more opportunities to participate in 
demonstrations immediately before and after an election, then the difference in time between 
survey and election becomes a significant complicating factor. 
Second, survey respondents have been known to overestimate their participation. For the survey 
conducted in Mozambique in 2005, 6 months after the 2004 election, a higher percentage of people 
responded that they had voted in the most recent election than the actual percent of people who 
voted when compared to the national population. 104 Thus the proclivity of respondents to 
"overestimate" their level of participation, and the varying lengths of time between election and 
survey as well as the varying lengths of time proposed in the actual question, once again make it 
challenging to draw any definitive conclusions for the "attend demonstration" variable. 


















Demand for Pearson 
-.102 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .598 
N 29 
Supply of Pearson -.785 
Correlation 










Sig. (2-tailed) .519 
N 16 
Obey Police Pearson 
.309 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .227 
N 17 





















Supply Demonstrations Contact 
of Attended Government Obey Police 
-.785 .127 .174 .309 
.000 .520 .519 .227 
29 28 16 17 
-.150 -.323 -.070 -.151 
.404 .082 .798 .514 
33 30 16 21 
1.000 -.055 .140 .294 
.774 .604 .196 
33.000 30 16 21 
-.055 1.000 -.074 -.350 
.774 .784 .141 
30 30.000 16 19 
.140 -.074 1.000 .484 
.604 .784 .058 
16 16 16.000 16 
.294 -.350 .484 1.000 
.196 .141 .058 











Free and Demand Supply Demonstrations Contact 
Fair Mean For of Attended Government Obey-Police 
Free and Fair Mean Pearson -1.000 -.102 .785 .127 .174 .309 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .598 .000 .520 .519 .227 
N 29.000 29 29 28 16 17 
Demand for Pearson 
-.102 1.000 -.150 -.323 -.070 -.151 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .598 .404 .082 .798 .514 
N 29 33.000 33 30 16 21 
Supply of Pearson -.785 -.150 1.000 -.055 .140 .294 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .404 .774 .604 .196 
N 29 33 33.000 30 16 21 
Demonstrations Pearson 
.127 -.323 -.055 1.000 -.074 -.350 
Attended Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .520 .082 .774 .784 .141 
N 28 30 30 30.000 16 19 
Contact Pearson 
.174 -.070 .140 -.074 1.000 .484 
Government Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .519 .798 .604 .784 .058 
N 16 16 16 16 16.000 16 
Obey Police Pearson 
.309 -.151 .294 -.350 .484 1.000 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .227 .514 ,196 .141 .058 
N 17 21 21 19 16 21.000 
Attend Contact Gov't 
Supply Demand Demonstration Obey Law Official 
Supply Pearson 
1.000 -.032 -.171 .380 ,144 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .871 .425 .147 .609 
N 28.000 28 24 16 15 5 










Chapter 8 Conclusions 
Based on the data analysis above there is enough evidence to conclude that elections and the quality 
of their outcomes impact democratic health as measured by perceptions of democratic supply and 
democratic demand. In order to prove this, this study first validated the FF mean and FF absolute 
percent scale by comparing them to each other and to FF Expert scale. There was a strong and 
significant correlation between FF mean and FF absolute percent, however the five or six cases that 
were considered outliers and found in quadrant 1 were equally informative. These elections were all 
subsequent elections following a flawed election, meaning that electoral outcomes had the ability to 
influence opinions even into the next election cycle. This further validates the "active learning" 
model that suggests citizens base their opinions on their interactions with democratic institutions. lOS 
The FF mean and FF absolute percent also correlated with FF Expert on a four point scale. The 
strength of the correlation and the value of eta squared being above .5 suggests that citizens do pay 
attention to elections and are equally capable of determining free and fairness as any other electoral 
independent expert. 
Second this study showed that there was a strong and significant relationship between electoral 
quality and perceived supply of democracy. Although the relationship between free and fairness 
and supply was significant on the absolute percent scale, the strength and significance of the 
correlation improved when "first" elections were removed from the dataset. Indeed many of the 
countries that transitioned to democracy in the early 1990s had low supply levels but high levels of 
free and fairness following the first election and were a significant distance away from the mean. By 
the second election (or in the case of South Africa the third election) these countries were much 
closer to the line of best fit. The reason for this discrepancy could be that citizens in these countries 
may have been unsure what to base their opinions of democracy on. After going through a full 
election cycle it appears that electorates begin to equate supply of democracy with free and fair 
elections. Unlike supply, the relationship between electoral quality and demand however, was weak 
and insignificant. Indeed after examining FF mean and Demand mean as well as FF absolute percent 
and Demand absolute percent, it is possible to conclude that there is no direct relationship between 
the level of freeness and fairness and the level of democratic demand. 
Thirdly this study sought to determine causality by examining the change in levels of supply and 
demand where elections and then countries was the unit of analysis. When elections were the unit 
of analysis this study showed that level of supply increased after free and fair elections, decreased 











after flawed elections and barely changed during periods of no elections. Similarly demand 
decreased after flawed elections, but also decreased during periods of non-election, and barely 
changed during free and fair elections. Although directionally and proportionally this data validated 
the hypothesis, the difference between the average change in supply and demand after free and 
fair, flawed, and no election was only significant at the .1 level on the Supply Absolute Percent Scale. 
This is largely due to the low number of data points and the disproportionate effect one election can 
have on the mean, standard deviation, and thus the significance. This was shown by removing both 
of the Zimbabwe elections from the dataset for change in demand. When Zimbabwe was removed 
the difference between the mean of flawed elections and the mean of free and fair became 
significant at the .1 level. The low number of data points also made it difficult to conclude that it 
takes at least two flawed elections to produce a significant decrease in demand. 
The directional and proportional changes were reaffirmed when using countries as a unit of analysis. 
The countries were split between those that had flawed elections and those that only free and fair. 
By the third round of the AB survey all of the countries that had flawed elections had supply levels 
below 2.4 (with the exception of Mali) whereas all those that had only free and fair elections had 
levels of supply greater than 2.4. Although the graphs that show change in demand per country do 
not have as clear a dividing point, there are characteristic that separates the free and fair from the 
flawed. The main characteristic being that countries with only free and fair elections show very little 
change from round to round, whereas those with flawed elections show more than a .2 change from 
round to round and mostly in the negative direction. This is especially true for countries with 
multiple flawed elections. 
Indeed as demonstrated by using both elections and countries as unit of analysis to assess the causal 
effect of flawed elections on supply and demand, elections seem much more capable of alienating 
democrats or reducing democratic health than of building democrats or improving democratic 
health. The fact that flawed elections have the ability to do more negative damage than free and 
fair elections can do positive good has implications for democratic consolidation in Africa. As 
discussed previously the demand component evaluates how consolidated a democracy is based on 
beliefs that democracy is the only legitimate form of government. Larry Diamond suggests that a 
democracy should only be considered consolidated if more than 2/3 of the population believe that 
democracy is the only legitimate form of government, which is also what the Demand component 
hopes to capture. Although no country in this study has achieved a Demand absolute percent score 
of 66%, the countries that are closest; Botswana, Ghana, Senegal, have also consistently had free 











committed democrats than other countries who have only had free and fair elections, but both of 
these countries lost nearly 20% of committed democrats following flawed elections. Thus free and 
fair elections alone do not seem to have the ability to achieve the Diamond threshold of 
consolidation, yet flawed elections are shown to reduce demand significantly and thus undermine or 
retard the consolidation process. 
Examining the effect of flawed elections on levels of participation in democratic activities was 
somewhat less fruitful. Although it is possible that elections influence the behaviour of the 
electorate on some level, both the lack of data and the inconsistency of the data analyzed here 
made it difficult to draw any definitive conclusions. However, the strong and significant correlation 
between the change in demand for democracy and the change in number of people who contacted a 
government official is both encouraging and suggests that future studies with the benefit of more 
data may be able to draw similar conclusions regarding the impact of flawed elections. 
Indeed as more data becomes available and the Afro barometer completes the fourth round of 
surveys I expect to find the strength of the correlation between electoral quality and supply of and 
demand for democracy to improve. The recent flawed elections in Kenya, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and a 
seemingly questionable but credible poll in Ghana has the potential to nearly double the number of 
dyads that capture a flawed election. Although a boon for this analysis, the elections in the past few 
years suggests that electoral quality is once again declining in Africa, after a period of relative 
improvement. If in fact this analysis holds up upon the inclusion of additional data, the declining 
quality of elections in Africa has significant consequences on support for democratic consolidation 
on the continent. It behoves other interested scholars to continue to investigate the effect of 
elections on democratic consolidation, and explore other avenues suggested here; such as the effect 
of early or 1st elections against later or 4th elections. This analysis also lends empirical evidence to 
what election observers and electoral organizations have been saying all along, electoral quality 
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